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ABSTRACT
This Article examines the use of decision-making triggers in
adaptive management plans focused on federal lands and fish and
wildlife management. Triggers are pre-negotiated commitments
made by an agency within an adaptive management or mitigation
framework specifying what actions will be taken if monitoring information shows x or y. The Article begins by placing adaptive management in its complicated political and legal context. Particular
attention is paid to how adaptive management and triggers fit into
NEPA decision-making and can be used to meet substantive environmental legal standards. We then describe six cases where triggers
are being used in adaptive management and mitigation planning and
outline the political and legal challenges to their implementation.
Several key findings emerge from our research. Rather than adaptive
management, the terms adaptive mitigation and/or contingency
planning are more accurate ways to describe the case studies reviewed. Another dominant theme is the limited enforceability of
monitoring commitments and triggered mitigation actions. Enforceability is contingent upon several factors, but agencies can design
triggers so that they are meaningful, enforceable and promote learning. Triggers also bring to the fore a number of long-standing scientific and political considerations about monitoring. The most difficult
question about triggers is where to set them. Some interests want
triggers to be used in a more precautionary way in order to acknowledge diminished ecological baselines and to prevent the crossing of
ecological and regulatory thresholds. We finish with recommendations. Though not without challenges, well-designed triggers can be
used as a way to improve implementation of adaptive management
while ensuring greater political accountability.
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INTRODUCTION
The language and ideas of adaptive management now pervade
federal lands management. Agencies typically view the approach as a
way to promote learning and proceed with actions in light of uncertainty
about potential resource effects and future conditions. In some cases,
agencies have interpreted adaptive management in a way that puts a
premium on flexibility, discretion, and the need for expedited decisionmaking. This, in turn, has led to some criticism of how agencies selectively apply the theory of adaptive management on-the-ground. There
are concerns that the flexibility and discretion purportedly needed to
practice adaptive management can be easily abused by agencies and
make it harder to hold them accountable for their actions.
There are two important political realities of adaptive management: (1) it is often being implemented in contexts high in mutual mistrust and, and (2) political interests are often seeking more certainty and
greater assurances about how resources will be managed in the future.
Add to this challenge the complicated legal reality of adaptive management, which is that its practice must comport to numerous environmental laws and regulations, with NEPA perhaps being most challenging of
all.
This Article examines one way to possibly reconcile the theory
and politics of adaptive management with the need for legal and political accountability: using pre-identified decision-making “triggers” or
commitments in an adaptive management framework. Put simply, a trigger specifies what actions will be taken by an agency if monitoring information shows x or y. In other words, some predetermined decisions, or
more general courses of action, are built into the adaptive framework
from the beginning of the process (i.e., if this, then what).
Triggers are being used as a way to provide an adaptive, yet more
structured, decision-making framework by identifying in advance precisely how, when, and why adaptive management plans will be altered
based on monitoring information. If explicit desired outcomes and goals
are identified at the outset, along with a monitoring plan to identify progress towards those goals, then triggers can be used as signals to indicate
progress or potential problems. A red light trigger would correspond
with a legal standard that cannot be crossed, whereas a yellow-light trigger would indicate that a protected resource is being affected negatively,
signaling the need for increased mitigation of effects, a change in management approach, or slowing of the pace of resource extraction. Greenlight triggers also might be used to signal the conditions are satisfactory
to proceed with increased development or other planned activities.
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This Article analyzes the use of triggers specifically in the context
of adaptive management and mitigation plans for natural resources. Part
I provides a brief background on adaptive management and the political
context in which it is practiced. Here we discuss how federal land agencies have implemented adaptive management and planning and review
some of the criticism and backlash that has ensued. The basic challenge
is how to plan and manage more adaptively while providing political
accountability and assurances that agencies will follow through on their
commitments. With these challenges in mind, we explore the concept of
triggers and how they might be used. This section also reviews how ecological and decision-making thresholds are used in this context and their
relationship to trigger mechanisms.
In Part II, we turn to the case law on adaptive management. Other
reviews have considered the broader landscape of case law on adaptive
management in general, but we focus on several legal issues that are
particularly germane to the role of triggers in adaptive management
plans. These include the task of demonstrating compliance with substantive legal standards and the nuances of navigating NEPA, while advancing a less-traditional and sometimes innovative planning framework. We
find that courts have allowed agencies to proceed with adaptive management plans as long as they demonstrate compliance with substantive
standards and comply with key NEPA requirements. If triggers are employed, agencies must explain what they indicate, demonstrate that they
are enforceable if legal requirements are implicated, and show that the
plan as a whole will ensure that substantive legal requirements will be
met. In the NEPA context, agencies must analyze potential effects up
front, but they also have been successful in deferring some analysis to
the project level, while at the same time tiering to adaptive management
in programmatic plans.
Part III then reviews a number of cases in which triggers, or trigger-like devices, have been used by agencies in implementing an adaptive management plan or project. All four federal land agencies are
covered in this section with cases focused on endangered species, fish
and wildlife, oil and gas, and forest and rangeland management. These
cases show that triggers are being used in some high profile adaptive
management initiatives and highlight some of the challenges that arise,
both legally and politically, with the use of triggers in such plans.
We reserve the bulk of our analysis for Part IV, where we analyze
in detail, from both political and legal perspectives, the most critical issues that arise from our review of the cases discussed in Part III. A number of contentious issues arise around the use of triggers. Despite the fact
that they are intended to increase accountability, numerous commentators on agency plans point out problems with the enforceability and de-
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sign of trigger mechanisms: Where are trigger points set and by whom?
How are monitoring and mitigation commitments enforced? Who designs, conducts, and assures the quality of the monitoring that takes
place? What, precisely, is triggered? And, are the plans themselves promoting learning and adaptive management in practice, or are we simply
getting a lot of lip-service for trial-and-error learning with ample room
for discretion and delays? We explore these issues in Part IV and conclude with recommendations for the incorporation of triggers into adaptive management plans.
I. BACKGROUND
This section places the practice of adaptive management in its political context. It begins by defining the term and making distinctions
between the theory of adaptive management and how it is often implemented by agencies. The section then explains why some political interests are concerned about the amount of discretion and flexibility
purportedly needed by agencies to practice adaptive management. It
then shows why triggers are seen by some people as a way to balance the
need for flexibility with political accountability. Taken together, these
factors help explain the interest in using triggers in adaptive resources
management.
A. Adaptive Management
Definitions of adaptive management abound. Thankfully, most of
them trace the approach to similar roots and include similar principles
(and cyclical flowcharts).1 In the context of federal lands management, a
standard definition, as adapted from the National Research Council, is as
follows:
Adaptive management [is a decision process that] promotes
flexible decision making that can be adjusted in the face of uncertainties as outcomes from management actions and other
events become better understood. Careful monitoring of these
outcomes both advances scientific understanding and helps
adjust policies or operations as part of an iterative learning
process. Adaptive management also recognizes the importance of natural variability in contributing to ecological resilience and productivity. It is not a ‘trial and error’ process, but
rather emphasizes learning while doing. Adaptive management does not represent an end in itself, but rather a means to

1. Most referenced in this regard is C.S. HOLLING, ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESS& MANAGEMENT (1978).
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more effective decisions and enhanced benefits. Its true measure is in how well it helps meet environmental, social, and
economic goals, increases scientific knowledge, and reduces
tensions among stakeholders.2

From this definition, we emphasize several key characteristics of
adaptive management. For one, it goes hand-in-hand with monitoring;
without monitoring, there can be no improved understanding of conditions or responses to management actions, and therefore, no informed
adjustment of on-the-ground practices. Secondly, adaptive management
has dual but interconnected purposes: these are to learn, or advance scientific understanding, and to adjust policies based on this information in
an iterative process.
People consistently distinguish adaptive management from trialand-error. The distinction is that trial-and-error processes are not designed intentionally to test various hypotheses, to promote learning, or
to proactively track resource responses and conditions. In fact, some
have pointed out that a trial-and-error could be maladaptive, in the sense
that it fails to improve management practices.3 If there is not improved
understanding of the causes of problems, a series of mitigation measures
might be pursued that do not effectively address these causes, potentially creating more problems and leading to a failure to improve resource conditions despite adjustments in practices. One need only to
make the analogy of an ecosystem to an extremely complex piece of machinery to understand why trial-and-error tinkering, undertaken only
when problems are blatantly apparent, might not lead to ideal outcomes.
By comparison, the adaptive process, as explained by Interior, is
more purposeful than trial-and-error management or what might be better described as “muddling through.”4 They explain:
Adaptive management as described [in the Technical Guide] is
infrequently implemented, even though many resource planning documents call for it and numerous resource mangers refer to it. It is thought by many that merely by monitoring
activities and occasionally changing them, one is doing adaptive management. Contrary to this commonly held belief,
adaptive management is much more than simply tracking and
changing management direction in the face of failed policies,

2. U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT: THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTECHNICAL GUIDE V (2009) [hereinafter INTERIOR TECHNICAL GUIDE]; see also NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT FOR WATER RESOURCES PLANNING (2004).
3. Id.
4. Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through”, 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79
(1959).
TERIOR
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and, in fact, such a tactic could actually be maladaptive. An
adaptive approach involves exploring alternative ways to
meet management objectives, predicting the outcomes of alternatives based on the current state of knowledge, implementing one or more of these alternatives, monitoring to learn
about the impacts of management actions, and then using the
results to update knowledge and adjust management actions.5

Most scientific and scholarly definitions include a similar set of
components, all designed to proceed in spite of, and at the same time
reduce, the inherent uncertainty of environmental management. Adaptive management is a systematic, iterative, incremental approach requiring the continuous monitoring, evaluation, and adjustment of
management actions. As such, it requires up-front design and often
slowing the pace of management activities in order to monitor, allow for
detection of resource responses, and adjust accordingly.
Adaptive management can also be understood in the negative, as
it is quite different than more typical front-ended approaches to management whereby assumptions and predictions are made in the beginning of
the process, but then not necessarily adjusted according to what actually
happens as a result. A NEPA Task Force, for example, contrasts the status quo “predict-mitigate-implement” NEPA-based model with a “predict-mitigate-implement-monitor-adapt model.”6
Similar to the point made by the Department of Interior that adhoc adjustments based on monitored conditions do not constitute adaptive management, some authors characterize what most agencies do as
“a/m-lite.” Ruhl and Fischman use this phrase to describe, “a watereddown version of the theory that resembles ad hoc contingency planning
more than it does planned ‘learning while doing.’”7 As we explain in
Part IV, what is being called adaptive management is often really contingency planning or adaptive mitigation. The idea is this: if we see resources do x, then we will respond by changing y or z, even if we do not
have any new understanding of why resources responded the way they
did. There is often nothing resembling an experimental framework, no
controls or research design to allow for learning, and, importantly, no
clear feedback loop indicating how information will be used to change
management actions.

5. INTERIOR TECHNICAL GUIDE, supra note 2, at 1.
6. THE NEPA TASK FORCE, REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY:
MODERNIZING NEPA IMPLEMENTATION ch. 4 (2003).
7. J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 424, 426 (2010).
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A commonality found in most adaptive management literature is
the need for a structured decision-making process and the identification
of clear and measurable management objectives. The Interior Department’s Technical Guide emphasizes both as crucial to the success of
adaptive management:
If the objectives are not clear and measurable, the adaptive
framework is undermined. Objectives need to be measurable
for two purposes: first, so progress toward their achievement
can be assessed; second, so performance that deviates from
objectives may trigger a change in management direction. Explicit articulation of measurable objectives helps to separate
adaptive management from trial and error, because the exploration of management options over time is directed and justified by the use of objectives.8

There is also an important distinction between active and passive
forms of adaptive management. The former is a more scientifically
based, experimental approach to management replete with formal study
design, controls, and replication. Here, learning is the primary objective.
Passive adaptive management, which is what we see more commonly in
natural resource management, is an approach wherein monitoring is
used to facilitate learning in order to inform the adjustment of management actions.9 However, without a study design to facilitate learning,
understanding causality may be more difficult under a passive approach.
B. Adaptive Management and Agency Discretion
Agency behavior is explained by numerous internal and external
political factors, from an organization’s culture and legislative mandate
to how it is funded and controlled by other branches of government.
This means that adaptive management is practiced by agencies with
their own goals, values, and biases, and one of the most universal biases
shared by agencies is their pursuit of administrative discretion. Federal
land agencies have a long and well-documented history of seeking administrative discretion in various forms, from open-ended statutes to
flexible budgets.10

8. INTERIOR TECHNICAL GUIDE, supra note 2, at 11.
9. See, e.g., C.J. Walters, Challenges in Adaptive Management of Riparian and Coastal Ecosystems, 1 CONSERVATION ECOLOGY 1 (1997); see also Cameron L. Aldridge et al., Adaptive
Management of Prairie Grouse: How Do We Get There? 32 WILDLIFE SOC’Y BULL. 92 (2004).
10. See, e.g., MARTIN NIE, THE GOVERNANCE OF WESTERN PUBLIC LANDS: MAPPING ITS
PRESENT AND FUTURE (2008).

R
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The innate administrative tendency to prioritize discretion helps
explain how some agencies have implemented adaptive management
and some of the backlash that has ensued. In some cases, agencies have
interpreted adaptive management in a way that emphasizes those aspects of the paradigm that promotes flexibility, discretion, and expedited
decision-making, while emphasizing less the aspects that allow for
knowledge generation and favor precautious decision-making. They
have, in other words, embraced some parts of the adaptive management
model while eschewing others.
Consider, for example, how the USFS approached adaptive management in its 2005 and 2008 planning regulations.11 The agency emphasized the problems and challenges of NEPA-based rational
comprehensive planning and proposed in its stead a “paradigm shift in
land management planning.”12 The 2005/2008 regulations embraced the
language and some of the core principles of adaptive management. The
agency emphasized the need for flexibility and adaptability of plans,
while at the same time categorically excluding National Forest plans
from NEPA analysis.13 To be truly adaptive the agency wanted to respond to new science, information, and problems more quickly.14 Forest
plans, therefore, would become “strategic and aspirational” in nature,
one tentative step in a more adaptive planning process, and not decisionmaking documents.15 Also gone from the regulations were some of the
sharpest standards and legal hooks holding the agency accountable, such
as the wildlife viability standard.16 Taken together, the message from the

11. The 2008 regulations are basically the same as the 2005 regulations, though the
2008 iteration went through the NEPA process, as ordered by a District Court whom found
the 2005 planning regulations in violation of the APA, NEPA, and ESA. See Citizens for
Better Forestry v. USDA, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (N.D. Cal. 2007). Compare National Forest
System Land Management Planning, 73 Fed. Reg. 21,468 (Apr. 21, 2008) (codified at 36
C.F.R. pt. 219), with National Forest System Land Management Planning, 70 Fed. Reg. 1023
(Jan. 5, 2005) (codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 219).
12. 70 Fed. Reg. 1023, 1024.
13. Id. at 1033. (stating that plan development, amendment, or revisions do not significantly affect the environment and thus are categorically excluded from NEPA analysis unless extraordinary circumstances are present; and that the USFS will comply with NEPA
when considering specific projects).
14. Id. at 1023. (“[i]ntended effects of the final rule are to streamline and improve the
planning process by making plans more adaptable to changes in social, economic, and environmental conditions.”); see Deann Zwight, Smokey and The EMS, 21 THE ENVTL. FORUM 28
(2004) (discussing the need for a more adaptive forest planning process).
15. Emphasized throughout the rule, and in subsequent forest plans using it, is that
the rule and plans “will not contain final decisions that approve projects or activities except
under extraordinary circumstances.” 70 Fed. Reg. 1023, 1024.
16. In its stead the USFS put forth a much less prescriptive “ecosystem approach” to
diversity. Id. at 1028.
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USFS was that it needed more flexibility and discretion in order to practice adaptive management.
The USFS’s discretion-based approach to adaptive management
did not sit well with environmental groups and their lawyers. Some critics believed that these regulations simply used the rhetoric of adaptive
management as cover to remove standards, undermine NEPA and
NFMA, and maximize agency discretion.17 The court also found fault
with the regulations,18 and at the time of this writing the USFS continues
to grapple with how to practice adaptive management while lawfully
implementing its other substantive and procedural obligations.19 Regardless of the outcome, the example demonstrates the suspicions around
adaptive management in light of the agency’s pursuit of discretion.
C. Adaptive Management and the Search for Certainty
Another important factor to understanding the politics of adaptive management is to appreciate the widespread search for certainty by
political actors of all persuasions. The search for certainty—through law,
policy, contract, or other means—is a dominant theme in natural resource politics. Political interests, from conservationists to industry to
communities, seek certainty in multiple forms: wilderness legislation
that permanently protects a place,20 more predictable timber supplies for
industry,21 long-term leases and property rights created in federal lands
mining,22 concession contracts in the National Parks,23 and the creation of

17. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Defenders of Wildlife et
al. v. Schafer, No. C08-02326 (N.D. Cal. 2008); Alyson Flournoy, Robert L. Glicksman &
Margaret Clune, Regulations in Name Only: How the Bush Administration’s National Forest
Planning Rule Frees the Forest Service from Mandatory Standards and Public Accountability
(Wash. D.C.: Center for Progressive Reform, White Paper, 2005); Nathaniel S.W. Lawrence,
A Forest of Objections: The Effort to Drop NEPA Review for National Forest Management Act
Plans, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10651 (2009); SOC’Y FOR CONSERVATION BIOLOGY, COMMENTS ON
PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE NATIONAL FOREST SYSTEM LAND AND RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
PLANNING RULE (2005); WILDLAW, REVIEW OF THE NEW NFMA PLANNING REGULATIONS
(2005) (on file with authors).
18. Citizens for Better Forestry v. USDA, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
19. See Notice of Intent to prepare an EIS, 74 Fed. Reg. 67,165 (Dec. 18, 2009) (asking
how the USFS’s new planning rule can be more adaptive and address uncertainty).
20. Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (1964); 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–36 (2006).
21. Martin Nie, Place-Based National Forest Legislation and Agreements: Common Characteristics and Policy Recommendations, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. 10229 (2011).
22. See, e.g., General Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. §§ 21–54 (2006) (creating a form of
property rights after the discovery of a valuable mineral deposit); Mineral Leasing Act of
1920, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (2006).
23. See National Park Service Concessions Management Act of 1998, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 5951–83 (2006).
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“grazing preferences” in federal range law,24 among others. In each instance, political interests seek certainty, stability, and assurances. The
challenge is clear: adaptive management is necessitated by the uncertainty inherent in science and management, and natural resource politics
is driven by the pursuit of certainty and stability.
Habitat conservation planning, as governed by the ESA, shows
this tension. As discussed below, habitat conservation plans (HCPs) are
basically a deal between the federal government and non-federal property owners. Both parties want something from the other: the federal
government wants their non-federal partners to contractually commit to
doing particular things for the benefit of species; and non-federal entities
want regulatory assurances and greater certainty about what they can
and cannot do in the future.
In an effort to bridge the tensions between the inherent uncertainties of ecosystem science and the desire for regulatory certainty, the
USFWS has promoted the use of adaptive management in HCPs.25 The
problem is that such provisions are often more rhetorical than substantive in nature: lots of boilerplate language about adaptation without any
specifics or guarantees that it will be done.26 In several cases, basic scientific information, monitoring, and adaptation are altogether absent in
such plans.27 But as we show below, in other cases triggers are being
used to implement the adaptive management schemes in HCPs as a way
to constrain the flexibility inherent in such plans, thus limiting the
amount of discretion given to an agency or regulated party.

24. The Federal Land Policy Management Act (FLPMA) provides various protections
to ranchers when grazing permits are cancelled, including two year prior notification and
reasonable compensation for adjusted values. See 43 U.S.C. 1752(g) (2006). Certainty has
also been central in the debate over grazing preferences and its relationship to base property and a specified quantity of forage. Current regulations define preference as “the total
number of animal unit months on public lands apportioned and attached to base property
owned and controlled by a permittee, lessee, or an applicant for a permit or
lease. . .[g]razing preference holders have a superior or priority position against others for
the purpose of receiving a grazing permit or lease.” 43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-5 (2010).
25. J.B. Ruhl, Taking Adaptive Management Seriously, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1249, 1274
(2004) (noting that since 1999 the USFWS’ handbook has promoted the use of adaptive
management in HCPs).
26. See, e.g., George F. Wilhere, Adaptive Management in Habitat Conservation Plans, 16
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 20 (2002).
27. See Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons From a Study in Maladaptive Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293 (2007) (showing how monitoring and adaptation is
mostly missing from the “ultimately defective” HCP program).
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D. Adaptive Management and Accountability
How to practice adaptive management while holding agencies accountable is another major challenge. Some interests are concerned that
the perceived need for flexibility, discretion, and expedited decisionmaking can be easily abused by agencies and make it harder to hold
them accountable for their actions.
These fears are exacerbated by the lack of specificity given to
adaptive management in law or regulation. Most administrative definitions are actually more vague than those found in the academic literature. No statute defines the term, and agency regulations doing so are
generally silent about how to implement the approach in its complicated
planning and regulatory context. Take, for example, the definition used
by the USFS:
A system of management practices based on clearly identified
intended outcomes and monitoring to determine if management actions are meeting those outcomes; and, if not, to facilitate management changes that will best ensure that those
outcomes are met or re-evaluated. Adaptive management
stems from the recognition that knowledge about natural resource systems is sometimes uncertain.28

As Ruhl points out, “One has to be concerned when legal text becomes even more obscure than the theory on which it is based.”29 The

28. 36 C.F.R. § 220.3 (2010). The USFS definition is essentially the same as that used by
the BLM (43 C.F.R. § 46.30 (2010)) and NPS (516 Dept. Manual § 4.16; NPS Management
Policies 156 (2006)). As discussed in Part III, the USFWS and NOAA Fisheries provide a
more specific definition as applied to habitat conservation planning:
For the purposes of the HCP program, we are defining adaptive management as a method for examining alternative strategies for meeting measurable biological goals and objectives, and then, if necessary, adjusting
future conservation management actions according to what is learned.
The Services are incorporating a broad perspective of adaptive management, with the key components that make an adaptive process in HCPs
meaningful. These components include careful planning through identification of uncertainty, incorporating a range of alternatives, implementing
a sufficient monitoring program to determine success of the alternatives,
and feedback loop from the results of the monitoring program that allows
for change in the management strategies.
Notice of Availability of a Final addendum to the Handbook for habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,242, 35,245 (June 1, 2000).
29. J.B. Ruhl, Adaptive Management for Natural Resources—Inevitable, Impossible, or Both?
54 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 11-1 (2008).
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problem, as Ruhl sees it, is that “[m]ushy definitions of adaptive management are likely to make for mushy standards of implementation.”30
How to appropriately balance the twin needs of adaptation and
accountability is a core but contested question in environmental governance. Much of the policy and legal scholarship on adaptive management
(and governance) goes so far as to suggest that modern environmental
problems require a fundamental reorientation of environmental law and
planning.31 But others offer a more modest and incremental approach.
Doremus takes this path in analyzing how adaptive management can be
used and abused by agencies in implementing the ESA. She believes that
without changes, adaptive management “may become just another
smokescreen to cover politically adaptive evasion of agency responsibilities.. . .”32 Doremus shows how agencies can use the highly malleable
term of adaptive management “as a ploy to placate demands for environmental protection without actually imposing any enforceable constraints
on themselves.”33
Nefarious agencies are not to blame here, but rather a set of builtin agency biases and political pressures influencing what questions are
asked in adaptive management, what controversies are avoided, and
how information is collected, interpreted, and acted upon. Doremus suggests a number of ways in which these biases might be counteracted and
accountability secured. These include citizen suits, mandated monitoring
and disclosure requirements, and the use of pre-negotiated management
commitments. She describes the latter:
Pre-negotiated commitments, in which the management agencies and regulated parties agree in advance on specific steps
that will be taken if monitoring shows that the species or system is in decline, are another strategy that can allow management decisions to precede heated controversies. Such precommitments have the advantage of leaving the exact parameters of management free to respond to future information,

30. Id.
31. See, e.g., RONALD BRUNNER ET AL., ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE: INTEGRATING SCIENCE,
POLICY, AND DECISION MAKING (2005); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 89 (2002); see Annecoos Wiersema, A Train Without Tracks: Rethinking the Place of Law and Goals in Environmental and
Natural Resources Law, 38 ENVTL. L. 1239 (2008) (providing a thorough review and critique
of the “new governance” literature).
32. Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the Institutional Challenges of ‘New Age’ Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 52 (2001).
33. Id. at 53.
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while providing closure to the decision-making process and a
degree of certainty to the regulated community.34

For Doremus, pre-negotiated commitments, or what we term triggers, are a way to combine the flexibility required by adaptive management with the accountability sought by various political actors.
However, the questions of accountability, transparency, and enforceability are pervasive; the trick is to include triggers and monitoring that are
meaningful so that they result in real management changes in a relevant
timeframe, and are enforceable. We take up this issue in more detail in
Part IV.
E. Triggers
The term trigger, as used here, is a type of pre-negotiated commitment made by an agency within an adaptive management or mitigation
framework specifying what actions will be taken if monitoring information shows x or y. In other words, predetermined decisions, or more general courses of action, are built into an adaptive framework from the
beginning of the process.
The cases and examples reviewed in Part III show how differently
triggers, or trigger-like mechanisms, are used by agencies. As shown in
Table 1, they run the gamut in terms of their design, specificity and enforceability. In some cases, triggers are detailed, legally binding commitments made in a contract or management plan. For example, in the case
of the biological opinion for salmonid species on the Sacramento and San
Joaquin River systems, a reviewing court approved the plan precisely
because the monitoring, triggers, and mitigation measures were legally
enforceable.35 In other instances, triggers are more discretionary and simply activate a range of possible contingency and/or mitigation actions. In
most cases, however, triggers are used as a way to limit the amount of
discretion afforded to agencies in practicing adaptive management.
In one sense triggers are common in environmental law. Consider
the ESA, for example, under which the protective measures of the statute
are not activated until the listing of a species.36 NEPA provides another
example, as certain processes and analyses are triggered when particular
findings are made by an agency, such as having to write a supplemental

34. Id. at 85.
35. See Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Gutierrez, 606 F. Supp. 2d. 1122 (E.D.
Cal. 2008).
36. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–33 (2006).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMN\52-2\NMN207.txt

456

unknown

Seq: 14

10-DEC-12

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

14:45

[Vol. 52

TABLE 1. Examples of triggers and responses in adaptive
management/mitigation
Case

Trigger

Response

Plum Creek HCP

If stream temperature
increases by 1° C with timber harvest

Revise or create riparian
prescription enhancements

Federal Columbia River
Power System Adaptive
Management Implementation Plan

If there is a significant
decline in the natural
abundance of the species
(salmon)

“Rapid response actions”
identified in four areas
(hyrdro operations,
predator control, harvest,
and hatcheries)

Pinedale Anticline Oil and
Gas Exploration and
Development Project in
Wyoming
Phased development

If there is a 15% decline in
mule deer population
Developed area has been
returned to functioning
habitat and successful reclamation completed

BLM chooses pre-identified
mitigation response (e.g.,
lease buyouts, habitat
enhancements)
Leased areas closed to
development in the project
area will be considered
available for development

Montana State Wolf Management Plan

If there are >20 breeding
pairs of wolves in state

Annual harvest of wolves
is allowed

Rocky Mountain National
Park Elk and Vegetation
Management Plan

If after 5 years of monitoring, vegetation conditions
do not show improvement
over baseline conditions

Additional protective measures will be implemented,
including the use of elk
redistribution techniques,
fertility control, additional
fencing, and possibly wolf
reintroduction

EIS if “significant new circumstances” emerge.37 For many years under
the Marine Mammal Protection Act, a trigger was set at the level of the
maximum net productivity level (MNPL) for populations; above this
level, no management was implemented, and below this level no kills
were allowed.38 These and other laws are important to our study. However, our use of the term is more narrowly focused on how pre-negotiated commitments are made in adaptive management plans.
Related to triggers is the use of thresholds in resources management. In the scientific literature, an ecological threshold is defined as “the
point at which there is an abrupt change in an ecosystem quality, property or phenomenon, or where small changes in an environmental driver
37. The writing of a supplemental EIS is triggered when the “agency makes substantial
changes in the proposed action that are relevant to environmental concerns; or there are
significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c) (2010). See infra notes
262–273 and accompanying text.
38. Barbara L. Taylor et al., Incorporating Uncertainty into Management Models for Marine
Mammals, 14 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1243, 1244 (2000).
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produce large responses in the ecosystem.”39 Scientific and managerial
interest in using thresholds has grown in concert with the popularity of
adaptive management.40
Triggers and thresholds can be used together when a crossing of a
threshold causes, or triggers, a legal or management response. Some
wildlife laws and regulations, such as the ESA and NFMA’s diversity/
viability regulation, use thresholds based on the abundance of a species.41 In these cases, a minimum demographically viable population
threshold is used. If the viability threshold is crossed, certain legal and
management actions are initiated. In other words, the crossing of threshold x, triggers action y.
While important, legal thresholds such as these are inadequate because if crossed, management actions are initiated too late in the process.
Another problem is the mismatch between the relatively simple and dichotomous use of legal thresholds and the more complex identification
and nature of ecological thresholds. An ecological continuum of change,
for example, might be less problematic than predicting a single threshold.42 Of course, the question of where to set thresholds and trigger
points is full of value judgments, such as how precautionary they should
be. Questions also arise as to what exactly is triggered, over what time
frame, and how such requirements might be enforced if not undertaken.
Triggers are also inextricably linked to monitoring, which raises the persistent questions of who funds, designs, and conducts the monitoring,
how quality is assured, and how monitoring requirements are enforced.
We pick up these issues again in Part IV.
II. ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT, TRIGGERS, AND THE COURTS
Agencies have only fairly recently begun to utilize adaptive management as a formal component of their decision-making, and the case
law in this area is relatively sparse. Nonetheless, several large-scale
plans, including the Northwest Forest Plan, species management on the
39. Peter Groffman, et al., Ecological Thresholds: The Key to Successful Environmental
Management or an Important Concept with No Practical Application, 9 ECOSYSTEMS 1, 1 (2006).
40. Id. at 2; see also Emery Roe & Michel Van Eeten, Threshold-Based Resource Management: A Framework for Comprehensive Ecosystem Management, 27 ENVTL. MGMT. 195 (2001).
41. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–33 (2006); National Forest Management
Act, 47 Fed. Reg. 43,026, 43,048 (Sept. 30, 1982) (codified at 36 C.F.R. §219.19 (1983-2000))
(providing a viability standard). See generally Robert L. Fischman & Jeffrey B. Hyman, The
Legal Challenge of Protecting Animal Migrations as Phenomena of Abundance, 28 VA. ENVTL. L.J.
173 (2010) (providing a more detailed discussion of various thresholds in environmental
law, and how they can be used an improved upon to conserve animal migrations).
42. Malcolm L. Hunter, et al., Thresholds and the Mismatch between Environmental Laws
and Ecosystems, 23 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1053 (2009).
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Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers, and flood control on the Missouri
River, have all seen several rounds of litigation regarding their approaches to adaptive management.43
Plaintiffs also have raised challenges to adaptive management as
an aspect of project-level decisions in forest management, Habitat Conservation Plans, and biological opinions issued in accordance with the
Endangered Species Act. Although the case law is not extensive, some
key lessons, which we discuss in detail below, can be taken as to what
courts are looking for in adaptive management plans in order to satisfy
legal requirements. These primary lessons are: 1) Agencies must show
that they will meet substantive standards;44 2) If they acknowledge uncertainty, they must show that they have a clear monitoring and mitigation strategy that is within their power to implement if unexpected or
unacceptable effects are detected;45 3) Tiering can be an appropriate tool
for pursuing adaptive management while complying with NEPA;46 4)
Courts do not always require additional NEPA analysis when new information comes to light, as long as any changes in action and predicted
effects are within the range of what was analyzed in the original NEPA
document.47
Ruhl and Fischman recently published the only comprehensive
overview of adaptive management case law written to date.48 They analyze thirty-one federal court decisions in which the judiciary speaks directly to the legality of adaptive management and find that federal
agencies lost more than half of these cases. A key theme of their analysis
is that larger-scale plans are often more suited to adaptive management
then smaller projects or plans, due to the array of mitigation options
available across large scales. Courts have upheld two adaptive management regimes, the Northwest Forest Plan and the Sierra Forest Framework, that employ experimentation and monitoring, even in situations
where listed species are at risk.49 For instance, an experimental approach
to assessing short-term risk to California Spotted Owls, which included a
clear commitment to monitor effects, coupled with reliable modeling of
potential future impacts, withstood challenges under NEPA as to
whether the agency took a “hard look” at environmental consequences.50
43. Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 7.
44. See infra notes 54–69 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 70–80 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 89–99 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 100–109 and accompanying text.
48. Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 7.
49. Id. at 448.
50. See California ex rel. Lockyer v. USDA, No. 2:05-CV-0211-MCE-GGH, 2008 WL
3863479 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2008).
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The key challenge with large-scale plans is striking the balance between
adaptability and a satisfactory level of commitment to monitor results
and take action if thresholds or trigger points are reached.
Ruhl and Fischman also note that tiering of NEPA documents appears to be well-suited to the practice of adaptive management.51 Adaptive management frameworks can be established at larger scales that
consider cumulative impacts or programmatic standards, and more sitespecific documents can tier to that analysis, obviating the need in some
cases for more detailed environmental impact assessment at the project
level. A final theme to emerge out of the adaptive management jurisprudence is that the courts demand assurances that adaptive management
plans meet substantive management criteria required by law. Examples
of substantive mandates include the “no jeopardy” standard in the ESA
under Section 7 and the viability standard in NFMA regulations.52 Ruhl
and Fischman explain, “When agencies lose challenges to their adaptive
management plans, it is often because their preference for management
latitude runs afoul of the need to show they can meet substantive and
procedural standards in statutes, regulations, or even their own earlier
plans.”53
Using the aforementioned analysis as a starting point, we explore
several issues in more detail. The use of triggers in adaptive management plans raises several important questions in the context of judicial
review. For instance, how much certainty do courts require from agencies in meeting substantive requirements by law, and when do these
standards limit the room agencies have to pursue more flexible approaches? Secondly, what approaches can an agency take to NEPA that
allow for flexible planning and the use of triggers or thresholds? When
do courts allow tiering and when do they require supplemental analysis?
We explore these topics in more detail below in order to shed light on
the case law that is most relevant to the incorporation of trigger mechanisms into adaptive planning.
A. Adaptive Management and Substantive Standards
To get a sense of the role of substantive standards, we consider
several cases involving species protection requirements under the ESA as
part of adaptive management plans. Agencies have achieved some success using adaptive management, even in the context of clear requirements not to jeopardize species, but only when mechanisms are built

51. Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 7, at 456–61.
52. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006); 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (2010).
53. Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 7, at 471.
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into the plan that require clear and meaningful actions that are triggered
when specific conditions are met.
Center for Biological Diversity v. Rumsfeld dealt with the issue of
future monitoring and mitigation to meet substantive legal standards as
part of an adaptive framework.54 The case provides some clarity on the
matter of subsequent standards and the leeway allowed in adaptive
management plans at smaller scales. At issue was the US Army’s Fort
Huachuca 10-year operating plan and the associated biological opinion
from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS). The draft biological
opinion found that the Fort’s planned actions were likely to adversely
affect several species and outlined specific requirements for water savings and for monitoring of species status.55 According to the Army, the
requirements were beyond the Army’s authority to implement, so it proposed a collaborative approach to water conservation in the watershed.56
The final biological opinion did not include specific requirements and
instead relied on a memorandum of agreement indicating that the Army
would undertake development of collaboratively designed mitigation
measures within the broader watershed.57 The final biological opinion
gave the Army three years to prepare the regional plan and identify potential conservation measures, but specific requirements were not included and were to be developed over the subsequent three years.58 The
result was that the no jeopardy opinion was reliant upon the future, successful development of a water conservation strategy, for lands outside
of the control of the Army in the larger sub-basin. The court noted that
until such a collaborative approach was in place and mitigation measures had been identified, the Army still had an obligation to show that it
was meeting substantive requirements of the ESA.59 Thus, the Army’s
responsibility to not jeopardize species remained unmet.
The court also ruled that potential mitigation measures were not
specific enough and did not include any targets reductions in water use
by any specific dates. “Without such specificity,” the court explains, “the
mitigation measures in the Final BO are merely suggestions.”60 Finally,
the court noted that a monitoring program that assesses which projects
have been implemented is not a meaningful analysis of impacts to the
watershed, which would require monitoring of actual waterflows.61
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Rumsfeld, 198 F. Supp. 2d. 1139 (D. Az. 2002).
Id. at 1146.
Id.
Id. at 1146–47.
Id. at 1150.
Id. at 1154.
Id. at 1153.
Id. at 1154.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMN\52-2\NMN207.txt

Fall 2012]

unknown

Seq: 19

10-DEC-12

ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT

14:45

461

A pair of cases reviewing adaptive management frameworks in
two biological opinions issued for operation of the State Water Project
and Central Valley Project in California illustrate how adaptive management and triggers can be situated within large-scale plans and when
agencies run afoul of legal requirements. At issue in Natural Resources
Council v. Kempthorne was the biological opinion issued for the Delta
smelt, a listed species under the ESA.62 Among the many challenges in
this case was the question of whether the adaptive management process
to mitigate impacts to the fish was adequate. In this case, the adaptive
management framework listed a number of factors that would trigger
action; these included, among other things, fish counts from the previous
year and estimations of the length of the spawning season.63 As the court
explains in its decision, if any of the triggers were set off, a working
group could meet if they deemed it necessary, decide whether to recommend any changes, and then submit recommendations that could potentially be undertaken by a separate management team.64 The court agreed
with plaintiffs that this was too uncertain and unenforceable of a framework to support a no jeopardy conclusion for ongoing operations of the
projects.65 Citing precedent from Center for Biological Diversity v. Rumsfeld,
the court noted:
Mitigation measures must be ‘reasonably specific, certain to
occur, and capable of implementation; they must be subject to
deadlines or otherwise-enforceable obligations; and most important, they must address the threats to the species in a way
that satisfies the jeopardy and adverse modification
standards.’66

What was triggered in this case, in the view of the court, was an
unenforceable and discretionary process, devoid of any clear requirements to take action, and the court found this to be legally insufficient
given the substantive requirements under section 7 of the ESA.
On the other hand, the same judge upheld the biological opinion
for the anadromous fish species affected by the same water projects.67 In
that case, the court determined that mitigation measures were specific
and were included under the terms and conditions of the incidental take
62. Natural Res. Council v. Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d. 322 (E.D. Cal. 2007).
63. Id. at 351–52.
64. Id. at 351.
65. Id. at 355–56.
66. Id. at 350 (citing Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Rumsfeld, 198 F. Supp. 2d. 1139,
1152 (D. Az. 2002)).
67. Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Gutierrez, 606 F. Supp. 2d. 1122 (E.D.
Cal. 2008).
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statement, which, the court noted, is enforceable by law and therefore
binding.68 In contrast to the case of the Delta smelt, the mitigation measures were specific, non-discretionary, and enforceable. For example, a
temperature requirement of 56 degrees or below was included for part of
the river system, and if it was not met, alternative methods of compliance had to be sought; reinitiation of consultation was triggered before
annual water delivery decisions could be made.69 In this case, the court
was satisfied because mitigation measures based on an enforceable standard and a non-discretionary mandate to reinitiate consultation were
both required before proceeding.
Another case demonstrating the importance of standards in adaptive management is Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Servheen.70 This decision vacated the delisting of the Greater Yellowstone Grizzly Bear
Distinct Population Segment (DPS) from the Endangered Species Act.71
One of the five factors to be considered when listing or delisting under
the ESA is “the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms.”72
Though not defined in the statute, the language means that sufficient
regulations must be in place before a species can be delisted so as to
ensure its long-term conservation. At issue in this case was the Grizzly
Bear Conservation Strategy, which included amendment of National Forest plans within the DPS boundaries and the creation of state grizzly bear
management plans for Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming. The Strategy, according to the USFWS “is an adaptive, dynamic document that establishes a framework to incorporate new and better scientific information
as it becomes available or as necessary in response to environmental
changes.”73 It included population standards and monitoring, with a goal
of maintaining more than 500 bears. The court ruled that this approach
was inadequate under the ESA because the Strategy was largely unenforceable and non-binding on state and federal agencies:
The majority of the regulatory mechanisms relied upon by the
Service—the Conservation Strategy, Forest Plan amendments,
and state plans—depend on guidelines, monitoring, and
68. Id. at 1185–86.
69. Id. at 1185–86.
70. Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Servheen, 672 F. Supp. 2d 1105 (D. Mont. 2009).
71. Removing the Yellowstone Distinct Population Segment of Grizzly Bears From the
Federal List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 72 Fed. Reg. 14,866 (Mar. 29, 2007)
(codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
72. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (2006); 50 C.F.R. § 424.11(d) (2010).
73. Designating the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem Population of Grizzly Bears as a
Distinct Population Segment; Removing the Yellowstone Distinct Population Segment of
Grizzly Bears From the Federal List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 70 Fed. Reg.
69,854, 69,861 (Nov. 17, 2005) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
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promises, or good intentions for future action. Such provisions
are not adequate regulatory mechanisms when there is no way
to enforce them or to ensure that they will occur.74

In this regard, the Court cited precedent holding that “the ESA
does not permit agencies to rely on plans for future action or on unenforceable efforts.75
Promises of monitoring made in the Conservation Strategy were
also insufficient according to the court, partly because such promises are
not a legally binding commitment that is enforceable under the Administrative Procedures Act (as discussed in Part IV).76 Though monitoring
protocols were included in the Conservation Strategy, there was no way
to enforce them. Even if they were enforceable, said Judge Molloy, monitoring alone would do nothing to protect grizzly bears: “Without tangible requirements specifying how the population will be maintained at
500 bears and how the mortality limits will be enforced, there is nothing
in this portion of the Conservation Strategy that actually serves as a regulatory mechanism to maintain the grizzly bear population.”77
The court also found inadequate the Forest Plan Amendments included as part of the Conservation Strategy. Like the USFWS, the U.S.
Forest Service (USFS) invoked adaptive management in amending six
forest plans in the Greater Yellowstone Area, but it did so with a more
problematic definition: “The direction in this amendment embraces an
adaptive management approach—as conditions change, so will management direction.”78 The court held that the Forest Plan Amendments contained few standards, most of which only applied within the bear’s
primary conservation area. Outside this area, the USFS provided no enforceable standards but, rather, “discretionary and thus legally unenforceable” guidelines.79 The lack of enforceable standards outside the
Primary Conservation Area, said the court, was not an adequate regulatory mechanism as required by the ESA. The same was true for the state
grizzly bear management plans that failed to require the states “to take

74.
75.
1998)).
76.
77.
78.

Greater Yellowstone Coalition, 672 F. Supp. 2d at 1118.
Id. at 1114 (citing Natural Res. Council v. Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1155 (D. Or.

Id. (citing Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 72 (2004)).
Id. at 1115.
U.S. FOREST SERV., FOREST PLAN AMENDMENT FOR GRIZZLY BEAR HABITAT CONSERVATION FOR THE GREATER YELLOWSTONE AREA NATIONAL FORESTS: RECORD OF DECISION A-2
(2006).
79. Greater Yellowstone Coalition, 672 F. Supp. 2d at 1117 (“[w]hen Forest Plans contain
standards, the standards are ‘mandatory requirements,’ in contrast to guidelines, ‘which
are discretionary’”) (citing Miller v. U.S., 163 F.3d 591, 594 (9th Cir. 1998)).
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any specific management response if mortality exceeds the limits in the
Conservation Strategy.”80
The take-home lesson is that agencies risk running afoul of the
courts if they cling too strongly to agency discretion and vague adaptive
management plans that are bereft of measurable standards and objectives. As Ruhl and Fischman explain, “Promises to plan, collaborate, or
manage toward compliance should environmental conditions degrade
below the substantive management criterion are insufficient to survive
judicial review.”81 Agencies must be clear how they will measure success
or failure and what exactly will trigger contingency actions.
B. Adaptive Management and NEPA Compliance
The art of coupling adaptive management with NEPA compliance
requires skillful navigation of several key issues. One question involves
the role of thresholds and triggers in plans and how they relate to effects
analysis in the NEPA context. Another challenging area is how to effectively utilize tiering of project-level analyses to larger-scale plans and
analyses and still meet requirements under NEPA. The questions here
are: how specific do large-scale or programmatic plans have to be, when
is supplemental analysis required, and how detailed do project level
plans need to be? The following cases provide insight into these issues.
In 2003, the National Park Service (NPS) issued a Temporary Winter Use Plan, in effect from 2004-2007, with a daily limit of 720 snowmobiles.82 The plan involved an “Adaptive Management Program,” which
included thresholds to determine whether goals for soundscapes, air
quality, and the wildlife protection were being met.83 At issue in Greater
Yellowstone Coalition v. Kempthorne was the NPS’ 2007 final environmental impact statement and record of decision (ROD) for a new Winter Use
Plan.84 Data collected under the temporary plan period indicated the
crossing of thresholds for noise and air quality on multiple occasions,
and the plaintiffs cited this as evidence of unacceptable impacts and impairment to park resources.85 The NPS responded that the plaintiffs were
misguided in assuming the thresholds correlated with a finding of unacceptable impacts; instead, they claimed, the thresholds were in place to

80.
81.
82.
2008).
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 1117.
Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 7, at 462.
Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Kempthorne, 577 F. Supp. 2d 183, 187 (D.D.C.
Id. at 188.
Id.
Id. at 192.
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serve as a warning system of when conditions might be trending in an
undesirable direction.86
The NPS lost this case because it failed to indicate what would have
constituted an unacceptable impact. The court wrote, “The ROD makes
no effort to explain, for example, why impacts on soundscapes characterized as ‘major and adverse’ do not ‘unreasonably interfere with the
soundscape’ and cause an unacceptable impact.”87 Without some “quantitative standard or qualitative analysis to support its conclusion that the
adverse impacts of the [Winter Use Plan] are ‘acceptable,’”88 the court
found the justification in the ROD to be arbitrary. The lesson here is that
all thresholds do not necessarily have to correlate with significance in
terms of impacts; however, if thresholds are crossed and an agency nonetheless finds impacts to be less than significant, there must be a clear
justification or rationale offered as to how this evaluation is made. Perhaps the most transparent methodology would be to include several
kinds of thresholds, some of which serve as indicators or warnings, and
some of which indicate bottom line standards for legal compliance that
cannot be crossed.
Another key issue with regard to NEPA compliance for adaptive
management frameworks is how to successfully utilize tiered NEPA
analyses. An instructive case is Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Center v.
Boody, which revolved around the issue of when, under an adaptive
management plan, supplemental NEPA analysis is required.89 The
Northwest Forest Plan (NWFP) of 1994 amended all National Forest
plans and resource management plans for BLM districts in the Pacific
Northwest; it also established Survey and Manage (S&M) requirements
for individual species that would not be adequately protected as a result
of the land management allocations.90 In 2000 the BLM and USFS issued
a final environmental impact statement (2000 FEIS)91 and in 2001, a Re-

86. Id. at 195.
87. Id. (reviewing the issue of unacceptable impacts in light of the National Park Service’s mandate under the National Park Service Organic Act of 1916, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2006),
and subsequent amendments and agency policies).
88. Id.
89. Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Boody, 468 F.3d 549 (9th Cir. 2006).
90. USDA FOREST SERV. AND USDI BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., RECORD OF DECISION FOR
AMENDMENTS TO FOREST SERVICE AND BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT PLANNING DOCUMENTS WITHIN THE RANGE OF THE NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL (1994) [hereinafter NWFP ROD].
91. USDA FOREST SERV. AND USDI BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT FOR AMENDMENT TO THE SURVEY AND MANAGE, PROTECTION BUFFER, AND
OTHER MITIGATION MEASURES STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES (2000).
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cord of Decision (2001 ROD)92 for amendments to the NWFP, including
changes to the S&M requirements. The 2000 FEIS considered the status
of the red tree vole and stated that approximately five years of data collection would likely be necessary prior to contemplating any changes to
its status under S&M requirements.93 In the summer of 2002, after doing
the first annual review for red tree voles, the BLM downgraded the species’ status, and in December 2003 the BLM removed the vole from S&M
designation completely.94 Neither of these decisions was accompanied by
any NEPA document, and plaintiffs brought challenges under FLPMA
and NEPA. Given that the decisions were contrary to what had been
anticipated under the 2000 FEIS and relied on significant new data, the
court ruled that these decisions constituted plan amendments.95
As for the NEPA claim, the BLM argued that the 2000 FEIS/2001
ROD contemplated changes in S&M designations as part of an adaptive
management framework. However, the court stated that simply because
an adaptive management plan contemplates potential changes, this does
not obviate the need to comply with FLPMA or NEPA.96 Essentially,
even though the 2000 FEIS contemplated adaptive management modifications, there are limits on how dramatic these can be without triggering
plan amendment requirements and NEPA; otherwise, plans would be
too open-ended. This was especially true in the case of the red tree vole,
given that the 2001 FEIS stated that this particular species would require
extensive additional research. The court held that if an agency takes action so contrary to what they found in a previous NEPA document, it
must explain the rationale for the action and complete a new NEPA anal-

92. USDA FOREST SERV. AND USDI BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., RECORD OF DECISION AND
STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE SURVEY AND MANAGE, PROTECTION
BUFFER, AND OTHER MITIGATION MEASURES STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES (2001).
93. See USDA FOREST SERV. AND USDI BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 91, at
392–93.
94. Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr, 468 F.3d at 553.
95. Id. at 556–57.
96. The court explained:
BLM is partly correct: the 2001 ROD contemplated that moving a species
from one survey strategy to another or dropping Survey and Manage protection for any species whose status is determined to be more secure than
originally projected could occur under the plan. However, merely because
the 2001 ROD contemplated this type of change, it does not necessarily
follow that all contemplated changes fall under the narrow definition of
plan maintenance in § 1610.5-4. If that were the law, BLM could circumvent the mandates of § 1610.5-5 (i.e., requiring environmental assessments
and impact statements, public disclosure, etc.) by merely designing a management plan that “contemplates” a wide swath of future change.
Id. at 557.
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ysis.97 In this case, the original FEIS did not provide any basis for the
BLM’s decisions; therefore, the judge explained, the decisions were
plainly inconsistent with the prior plan and EIS.98 NEPA also requires
SEISs when there is significant new information, as there was in this
case.99
When the agencies have tried to make substantial changes to requirements in adaptive management plans, courts have required new
analysis, in the form of plan amendments and supplemental NEPA analysis. This is the case when the new information or the permitted actions
are outside the bounds of what was originally discussed in the NEPA
document.100 On the other hand, in cases such as Oregon Natural Resources
Council Action v. USFS courts have also indicated that the USFS does not
always need to prepare supplemental analyses if the adaptive management actions and collection of additional information were covered in a
prior, programmatic EIS.101 In this case, where new information emerged
regarding water quality and the status of some species under the Endangered Species Act, the court explained, “The plan’s adaptive management approach is adequate to deal with any new information plaintiffs
have identified. If circumstances warrant, the ROD gives the Forest Service and the BLM the flexibility to reduce or halt logging in order to
comply with their statutory mandates.”102 In other words, flexibility can
be built into a NEPA assessment that anticipates changes in conditions
and gives an agency the opportunity to adjust activities within certain
limits. In the case of the NWFP, survey and manage requirements allow
for adaptive decision-making if species are detected; there are also baseline standards that limit the total amount of logging and require compliance with standards and guidelines.103 New information does not always
require the preparation of a supplemental EIS, unless it fundamentally
alters the predictions in the original EIS or if the response to the new
information is plainly contrary to what was planned or predicted in the
original EIS.
A final example provides several other lessons related to tiering
and supplemental NEPA analysis. Ruhl and Fischman explain, “The
97. Id. at 561–62.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 561–62 (noting that the change in the vole’s status was based on data, 80
percent of which was new since the prior FEIS).
100. See Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr., 468 F.3d 549; Or. Natural Res. Council Action v.
U.S. Forest Serv., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (W.D. Wash. 1999); Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. Rey,
380 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (W.D. Wash. 2005).
101. Or. Natural Res. Council Action, 59 F. Supp. 2d 1085.
102. Id. at 1096.
103. Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr., 468 F.3d 549 (9th Cir. 200); see also id.
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most cited litigation endorsing the notion that adaptive management is
compatible with NEPA and administrative law concerns the Army
Corps’ management of the Missouri River, which it controls through its
dams.”104 For example, in a 2008 hearing, the court ruled that it was appropriate for the Corps to utilize an environmental assessment (EA) to
determine whether impacts resulting from changes in its springtime
water release strategies were consistent with management strategies that
had been analyzed in a 2004 FEIS.105 The Corps determined that the impacts resulting from the new bimodal springtime release strategy were
within the range of impacts considered in the 2004 FEIS and determined
that no supplemental EIS was necessary.106 At the same time, they also
determined that a FONSI was not appropriate, because significant impacts, which had already been analyzed in the 2004 FEIS, were predicted.107 The court ruled that Corp’s method of complying with NEPA
while navigating the incorporation of a change in management strategy
was adequate.108 It noted a supplemental EIS is only required when the
change in management direction is one that was not within the spectrum
of alternatives analyzed in the prior EIS.109 Even if an agency decides to
implement aspects of an alternative not originally selected, as long as the
impacts have been analyzed and no significant new information has
arisen, supplemental NEPA analysis is not required.
Several other issues related to NEPA are worth mentioning
briefly. As discussed above, agencies must clearly demonstrate that they
will not cross any substantive legal thresholds. Where compliance with a
land use plan, such as a forest plan, is at issue, a NEPA analysis often
will need to explain how forest plan standards will be met, if these are
written as legally enforceable and substantive standards. If a land use
plan allows for trending towards desired conditions, then adaptive management could be used to explore different management strategies, as
long as the analysis showed that contemplated courses of action will
trend resources in the desired direction.
Agencies must undertake some analysis of effects, based on the
information available, even if they acknowledge a role for future research on effects. For example, in Mountaineers v. USFS (2006) plaintiffs
challenged a project that would have allowed for greater access to the
overall off-road vehicle trail system in the area.110 A court enjoined a pre104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Ruhl & Fischman, supra note 7, at 454–55.
In re Operation of the Mo. River Sys. Litig., 516 F.3d 688, 695 (8th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 694.
Id. at 695.
Id.
Id. at 693.
Mountaineers v. U.S. Forest Serv., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (W.D. Wash 2006).
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vious incarnation of this project and ordered the USFS to study the cumulative effects of the trail system on wildlife.111 In their cumulative
effects analysis for the Mad River Trail EA, the USFS provides “a general
level of analysis, and then stops, proposing further study.112 The court
calls this a “build first, study later” approach and enjoins the project.113
The court cites Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. USFS (1998), noting that it
is well-established that even when monitoring information is limited,
NEPA requires effects analysis before a project takes place.114
As we discuss further in Part IV, if an agency plans on utilizing an
EA and a FONSI to support its decision, it must provide assurance that
future mitigation measures will be undertaken and will prevent effects
from reaching the threshold of significance under NEPA.115 If an agency
is planning an adaptive approach and is unsure of possible significant
effects, an EIS is the appropriate document.116 An EA cannot be used if
there is significant uncertainty about how planned actions will affect resources. Adaptive management or mitigation tools in an EA are appropriate for responding to relatively minor changes in environmental
conditions or tweaking management within allowable and anticipated
limits. If an EIS is used, there is more room to acknowledge uncertainty
about effects. However, it still must be clear that the proposed action and
any adaptive management options will not violate legal standards.
III. EXAMPLES OF TRIGGERS IN ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT/
MITIGATION PLANS
In this section we consider a number of cases where agencies use
triggers as part of an adaptive management plan. These are short summaries of the general history and adaptive management framework for
each example, with information on the primary controversies or challenges. It is not our intention to provide full-fledged case studies, with a
complete history and full range of perspectives on each situation, although we summarize some of that detail. This is also not intended to be
an exhaustive catalog of all cases where triggers are part of some kind of
explicit or implicit adaptive management plan. The examples selected

111. See N. Cascades Conservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 98 F. Supp. 2d 1193
(W.D. Wash. 1999).
112. Mountaineers, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 1250.
113. Id.
114. Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. U.S. Forest Serv., 137 F.3d 1372 (9th Cir. 1998).
115. See infra notes 236–243 and accompanying text.
116. See 42 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (b)(5) (2010) (stating that an EIS is triggered in cases where
“[t]he degree to which the possible effects on the environment are highly uncertain or involve unique or unknown risks . . .”).
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provide a variety of contexts and approaches, include a clear use of trigger mechanisms, and offer insight into how triggers are used and the
associated challenges.
A. Federal Columbia River Power System Adaptive Management
Implementation Plan
Salmon and Steelhead populations in the Columbia Basin are
threatened because of the construction and operation of the Federal Columbia River Power System (FCRPS). Thirteen evolutionary significant
units (ESUs) of salmon and steelhead in the Basin are listed as threatened
or endangered under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). As a result,
NOAA Fisheries (formerly National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS))
must write a biological opinion (BiOps) determining whether operation
of the system is jeopardizing these species. These decisions have been
extremely controversial and litigated since the first salmon listing in
1991.117 Several BiOps have been rejected by the courts with their rewriting guided by these decisions.
The FCRPS Adaptive Management Implementation Plan (AMIP)
was developed in response to the latest federal court decision setting
aside the 2008 BiOp. The revised BiOp describes the adaptive management approach as a way to deal with uncertainty, use best available science, and address the deficiencies of the previous BiOp as identified by
the court. Core to the revised BiOp are “biological triggers that when
tripped, will activate near and long-term contingency actions, should the
agencies detect a significant decline in the species’ condition.”118 These
pre-defined biological triggers are designed to “alert the federal agencies
if further action is warranted,” and are meant to be more precautionary
than the 2008 BiOp.119
Contingency actions are initiated in two ways. An “early warning
indicator” will alert agencies “‘to a decline in species’ abundance level
for natural-origin adults that warrants further scrutiny because it indicates that a significant decline may be reached in one to two years. The
indicator for each species will be a running four-year mean of adult

117. For a review of this litigation see NIC LANE, KRISTINA ALEXANDER & EUGENE H.
BUCK, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT RL34453: ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND
LEGAL ISSUES REGARDING COLUMBIA BASIN SALMON AND STEELHEAD (2008), available at http:/
/wlstorage.net/file/crs/RL34453.pdf; and Michael C. Blumm & Hallison T. Putnam, Imposing Judicial Restraints on the “Art of Deception”: The Courts Cast a Skeptical Eye on Columbia
Basin Salmon Restoration Efforts, 38 ENVTL. L. 47 (2008).
118. FED. COL. RIVER POWER SYS. ADAPTIVE MGMT. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, 2008—2018
FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM BIOLOGICAL OPINION (Sept. 11, 2009), at 8.
119. Id.
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abundances that falls below a 20 percent likelihood of occurrence.”120
Also used in the BiOp is a “significant decline trigger,” whereby agencies
will check yearly for a significant decline in the natural abundance of the
species, and this is “judged to occur when the running four-year mean of
natural-origin adult abundance falls below a 10 percent likelihood of occurrence based on historical data.”121 Various thresholds are used in this
regard and “represent significant deviations from the biological expectations in the 2008 BiOp.”122 If a significant decline trigger is tripped, the
AMIP identifies “rapid response actions” in four areas (hyrdro operations, predator control, harvest, and safety-net hatchery programs) and
long-term contingency actions that may be taken.
The states of Washington, Idaho, and Montana, among other parties, support the AMIP and believe it is consistent with the ESA and the
growing body of adaptive management case law (as discussed in the
previous section). The plan, they say, “reflects a commitment to do what
it necessary to ensure that continued operation of the FCRPS will not
appreciably reduce the likelihood that wild salmon will continue to survive and ultimately recover.”123 This being the case, the States argue that
deference should be given to NOAA Fisheries in how the AMIP and its
triggers are designed and implemented. They also argue that the habitat
mitigation responses comport with the theory and legal parameters of
adaptive management because they include “some form of measurable
goals, action measures, and a certain implementation schedule.”124 In
short, those supporting the AMIP argue that its trigger mechanisms,
along with other protective measures in the 2008 BiOp, provide reasonable assurances that mitigation, if necessary, will in fact occur.
Despite this elaborate process, environmental plaintiffs are not at
all impressed with the BiOp’s adaptive management plan and have challenged it in court.125 They complain that the plan, despite all of its bellsand-whistles, does nothing to change the final no-jeopardy analysis, as
found in the previous 2008 BiOp, nor provide any meaningful ways to
120. Id. at 12. For more detail on the formation and application of these triggers see id.
at Appendix 4.
121. Id. at 13.
122. Id.
123. Joint Memorandum of Washington, Idaho and Montana In Support of Their CrossMotion for Summary Judgment and In Opposition to Summary Judgment Motion of Plaintiffs and Oregon at 1, Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 839 F. Supp. 2d
1117 (D. Or. 2011).
124. Id. at 30 (citing Natural Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322, 355
(E.D. Cal. 2007).
125. Supplemental Memorandum in Support of NWF’s Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment, Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, et al., v. Oregon (D. Or. 2010) (regarding 2010 Supplemental BiOp) (on file with authors).
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protect listed species. They question the science on which it is based and
want a more precautionary approach, as they believe is required by the
ESA.
One problem plaintiffs have with the AMIP is that “the rapid response measures of the AMIP are just possible responses if a decline trigger is tripped. The response measures certainly are not actions the
agencies actually are required to implement now to avoid jeopardy.”126
Furthermore, plaintiffs argue that the AMIP is replete with “stock
phrases about adaptive management,” but “the critical objective standards, analytic methods, detailed monitoring plan, and contingent actions are all missing or—at best—will be addressed later.”127 What is
needed in the Plan, say plaintiffs, are specific quantitative performance
standards:
What is missing is any objective standard for population-specific productivity that must be met by a particular time, or a
specific survival standard for habitat actions for a particular
species in a particular tributary, methods that will be used to
make these determinations, specific monitoring that will collect the necessary data, and specific contingent actions that
will occur if the standards are not met. Rather than sciencebased adaptive management, the 2008/2010 BiOps propose a
vague flow-chart process that lacks all of the hallmarks of science-based adaptive management.128

Plaintiff’s also argue that the triggers included in the AMIP need
to be more precautionary, conservative, and be used in a way to comply
with, and not evade, the ESA. They want the triggers set with a greater
margin of safety, and to be used in a more meaningful way, so that if
they are tripped, more than vague administrative processes will result.129
The State of Oregon, which is another plaintiff in the case, similarly argues that the AMIP is “little more than a recasting of the existing
BiOp in a ‘precautionary’ light.’”130 “It’s precise legal character is un126. Id. at 3.
127. Id. at 28.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 29. Plaintiffs cite Natural Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d 355
(E.D. Cal. 2007), as it rejected an adaptive management plan that was “in substance an
organizational flow chart that prescribes that certain administrative processes (meetings)
will be held whenever a trigger criteria is met or exceeded. Although mitigation measures
are identified, no defined mitigation goals are required, nor is any time for implementation
prescribed.”
130. The State of Oregon’s Response to the Adaptive Management Implementation
Plan, Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 839 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (D. Or.
2011), at 3.
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clear” says the State, and it does nothing to improve what it sees as an
invalid biological opinion. Oregon argues that promises of things that
might be done in the future are an inadequate way of complying with the
ESA and recovering salmon populations. “Vague mitigation measures
cannot support a biological opinion,” says the State.131
Oregon is particularly critical of how biological triggers are used
in the AMIP, arguing that they will not be activated until long after
salmon species have declined to dangerous levels. It argues “the new
measure of success is to simply avoid disastrous declines” of salmon.132
Instead, the State wants triggers to be set to ESA recovery standards, a
bar set much higher. Furthermore, if pulled, the State believes the
AMIP’s triggers deploy plans and studies, not actions that will benefit
salmon.133 And if such responses did ever materialize, Oregon believes
they would be implemented much too late to avoid jeopardy.134
Although triggers were used in this case as a way to provide
greater certainty and precaution than what was provided in earlier biological opinions, the 2008/10 BiOp and AMIP met the same fate as earlier management plans. It failed to survive judicial review because it
improperly relied upon future actions that “are not reasonably certain to
occur.”135 Judge Redden concluded that the BiOp “failed to adequately
identify specific and verifiable mitigation plans beyond 2013” and that
the no-jeopardy finding by NOAA Fisheries was therefore arbitrary and
capricious. Of particular relevance to triggers and adaptive management
is Judge Redden’s finding that the ESA requires specific actions be taken
and not just an agency “commitment” to species survival: “It is one thing
to identify a list of actions, or combination of potential actions, to produce an expected survival improvement and then modify those actions
through adaptive management to reflect changed circumstances. It is another to simply promise to figure it all out in the future.”136
This case provides another instance where the use of trigger
mechanisms are purportedly used as a way to provide a more structured
and less discretionary approach to adaptive management. Their use
came as a result of litigation and the need to provide a more precautionary, science-based, and assured way of meeting the strictures of the ESA.
But as demonstrated in other cases, there are serious concerns about
where the triggers are set and what happens if they are pulled.
131. Id. at 13.
132. Id. at 18.
133. Id. at 22.
134. Id.
135. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 839 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1122 (D.
Or. 2011).
136. Id. at 1128.
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B. The Pinedale Anticline Oil and Gas Exploration and
Development Project in Wyoming
The BLM uses trigger mechanisms in various adaptive approaches to energy development in the West.137 A controversial example
is the Pinedale Anticline oil and gas exploration and development project in the Upper Green River valley of northeastern Wyoming. The project was the BLM’s first effort in using adaptive management in oil and
gas development.138 The agency tried the approach partly because of the
possible impacts of natural gas development to wildlife in the area, including sage grouse, mule deer, and pronghorn antelope.
The BLM’s 2008 Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement
(SEIS) and Record of Decision (ROD) include the use of a “wildlife monitoring and mitigation matrix” in which wildlife populations and behavior changes serve as triggers for mitigation measures.139 The 2008 ROD
states that “this process is designed to provide certainty to the affected
agencies and the public that impacts to wildlife will be addressed before
consequences become severe or irreversible by monitoring changes and
responding early.”140 The matrix specifies the changes that will be monitored for mule deer, antelope, sage grouse, and other sensitive species.
Take mule deer for example. The specific change requiring mitigation for
this species is a 15 percent decline in any year, or cumulatively over all
years compared to a reference area.141

137. See e.g., the Jack Morrow Hills Coordinated Activity Plan, which is an amendment
to the BLM’s Green River Resource Management Plan in southwestern Wyoming. BUREAU
OF LAND MGMT., RECORD OF DECISION AND JACK MORROW HILLS COORDINATED ACTIVITY
PLAN/GREEN RIVER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN AMENDMENT (2006). The Plan uses a
“measure and trigger” matrix for various indicators, from elk distribution to sage grouse
lek use. The matrix is used to “guide” management decisions, though “[a]ction will be
taken before an indicator reaches a trigger point since operating outside these bounds indicates a failure of the management strategy.” BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., JACK MORROW HILLS
COORDINATED ACTIVITY PLAN/GREEN RIVER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN AMENDMENT: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (2004), app. 17, at 12. The BLM acknowledges the
uncertainty of where the measures and triggers are set and sees them as a “first cut” that
might be refined later. Id. The agency also anticipates using a “better safe than sorry” approach in responding to various indicator changes. Id. at 17.
138. See generally Melinda Harm Benson, Integrating Adaptive Management and Oil and
Gas Development: Existing Obstacles and Opportunities for Reform, 39 ENVT’L. L. REP. 10962
(2009).
139. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., PINEDALE ANTICLINE PROJECT AREA SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT AND RECORD OF DECISION (2008), at 19. The 2008 ROD/SEIS
was preceded by a ROD issued in 2000 that was challenged by oil and gas and conservation
interests.
140. Id. at B-4.
141. Id. at B-1.
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If triggered, the BLM is then required to select a mitigation response that is listed in the matrix. Mitigation includes on-site and off-site
responses, such as voluntary lease suspensions, lease buyouts, habitat
enhancements, and the purchase of conservation easements and property for wildlife benefits. Monitoring and mitigation are paid for out of a
designated fund, financed by the three largest operators in the region
(Ultra, Shell, and Questar) who provided $36 million to mitigate
impacts.142
Related to the project’s use of triggers is the use of concentrated,
staged, or a “phased” type of development. This approach staggers development so that some places are off-limits to exploitation until reclamation, as measured by various indicators, is completed in other areas.
Phased development is being used elsewhere by the BLM, such as on the
equally controversial Roan Plateau in Colorado.143 At a general level,
conservationists generally favor this phased approach,144 while the oil
and gas industry has some concerns about how it is designed and the
impact it could have on existing lease rights.145
On the Anticline, phased development means that the project area
is divided into zones, including a core area for intensive development,
potential development areas, flank areas and river corridors. After a fiveyear period, individual or multiple leases closed to development “will be
considered for conversion to ‘available for development’ when a comparable acreage in the core area. . .has been returned to functioning habitat
through the completion of all development operations and successful
reclamation of all portions of the well pads within the comparable
area.”146 Habitat is considered “functioning when the comparable area is

142. Id. at 17.
143. See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT, ROAN PLATEAU PLANNING AREA: RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN AMENDMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (2006).
144. See e.g., Bruce M. Pendery, BLM’s Retained Rights: How Requiring Environmental Protection Fulfills Oil and Gas Lease Obligations, 40 ENVT’L. L. 599, 676 (2010). The BLM was
forced to consider the approach in its NEPA analysis of developing of coal bed methane in
Montana’s portion of the Powder River Basin. See N. Plains Res. Council v. U.S. Bureau of
Land Mgmt., CV 03-69-BLGRWA, 2005 WL 6258093 (D. Mont. Apr. 5, 2005); N. Cheyenne
Tribe v. Norton, 503 F.3d 836 (9th Cir. 2007).
145. Some in the petroleum industry view forms of phased development as “unduly
restrictive and violative of valid existing lease rights.” This is because some leases could be
held in suspense until monitoring shows that specific resource indicators have not been
breached. DENISE A. DRAGOO, AM. PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT AS APPLIED TO OIL AND NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT ON ONSHORE FEDERAL LANDS 21 (2004), available at http://nwcos.org/Resources/AM%20Materials/Final%20AdaptMgt%20Report%
206%2010%2004.pdf.
146. THE WILDERNESS SOC’Y, THE 2008 PINEDALE ANTICLINE PROJECT AREA (PAPA) SEIS/
ROD: LESSONS AND CHALLENGES 6 (2010) (on file with authors).
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providing sustainable forage (shrubs, forbs, and grass) for wildlife and
livestock as determined by animal use and stable populations based on
the Wildlife Monitoring and Mitigation Matrix.”147
The BLM’s use of triggers and adaptive management on the
Pinedale Anticline has had a mixed reception. On the one hand, some
players in the region, like the Wilderness Society (TWS), believe the matrix “has potential as a model for how BLM can include concrete thresholds of changes that will trigger adaptive management actions to
ameliorate or mitigate wildlife impacts,” but that unfortunately, “this
model has not been realized.”148 The potential is there, says TWS, for the
Pinedale project to “showcase best practices and more responsible drilling on public lands,” but that this potential “only exists on paper if the
BLM cannot deliver on implementation.”149
Another complaint is that the 2008 SEIS stems from the BLM’s
experiment with adaptive management on the Anticline in 2000, which
many believe was an unequivocal failure. Instead of following through
on the commitments made in the 2000 ROD, some groups believe the
BLM made “adaptive” adjustments as a way to simply allow for more
intensive energy development in the region. Some groups also mistrust
the BLM because some mitigation commitments made by the agency in
2000 were not implemented as expected.
More mitigation is promised in the 2008 SEIS, but the Theodore
Roosevelt Conservation Partnership (TRCP) believes the promised responses are an insufficient way of protecting wildlife on the Anticline.150
According to the Partnership, the triggered responses are more of a recommendation that must be approved by industry than a secure binding
commitment. The Partnership also takes issue with the industry’s role in
designing the mitigation matrix. “Because the Companies developed the
Matrix, it is no surprise the Matrix is opaque and ultimately places the
decision of whether to change operations, in the Companies’ hands.”151
Regardless of their impacts, TRCP doubts that oil and gas operations will
change “until all other options are exhausted, and then such changes
may be made only if the Companies agree.”152 Furthermore, the Partnership
argues that even if changes were triggered, they could not be made
quickly enough to benefit wildlife.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 3.
149. Id.
150. Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership, Motion for Summary Judgment
and Supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 744 F. Supp. 2d 151 (D.D.C. 2010).
151. Id. at 28.
152. Id. at 29.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMN\52-2\NMN207.txt

Fall 2012]

unknown

Seq: 35

ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT

10-DEC-12

14:45

477

These arguments did not persuade a D.C. District Court, which
found the BLM’s discussion of mitigation measures satisfactory for purposes of NEPA.153 Despite its tumultuous history, the 2008 SEIS and its
mitigation matrix were upheld by the Court. However, at the time of this
writing its implementation is far from certain. The BLM is now confronted with research showing that the area’s deer herd has declined to
less than half its size as estimated in 2001, thus triggering the mitigation
measures as described above. All eyes are on the BLM to see how it responds, with some observers seeing the situation as a referendum on
adaptive management.154
C. Habitat Conservation Planning
Section 10 of the ESA provides for the writing of Habitat Conservation Plans (HCPs) that provide regulatory assurances to non-Federal
property owners through the issuance of an incidental take permit (ITP).
The commitments provided in an HCP are made binding through the
ITP. To be granted, the permit requires that (1) the taking of a species
will be incidental to otherwise lawful activities, (2) the taking will, to the
maximum extent practicable, be minimized and mitigated; (3) adequate
funding for the plan be provided, and (4) the taking will not appreciably
reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of a species in the
wild; and (5) such other measures be implemented that the services may
requires as being necessary or appropriate for purposes of the plan.155
HCPs are essentially a deal between non-federal property owners
and the Fish and Wildlife Service and/or NOAA Fisheries. The former
are seeking increased and long-term certainty about what they can and
cannot do on their lands, while the agencies hope to provide appropriate
incentives to private property owners while gaining net conservation
benefits for species in need of protection. In many respects, the pursuit of
regulatory certainty drives much of the HCP process, as it does with
other incentive-based ESA programs such as Safe Harbor Agreements
and Candidate Conservation Agreements with Assurances.156 HCPs are
153. Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 744 F. Supp. 2d 151, 164
(D.D.C. 2010).
154. Phil Taylor, Mule Deer Declines in Wyo. Gas Field Warrant ‘Serious’ Mitigation Response, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/10/22/22green
wire-mule-deer-declines-in-wyo-gas-field-warrant-se-56702.html?pagewanted=all.
155. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A) (2006).
156. The safe harbor policy is “designed to create incentives for non-Federal property
owners to implement voluntary conservation measures for certain listed species by providing certainty with regard to possible future restrictions should the covered species later
become more numerous as a result of the actions taken by the non-Federal cooperator.
Non-Federal property owners, who through a Safe Harbor Agreement commit to imple-
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made binding through the issuance of the ITP and these contracts contain several legal commitments made by both parties. Plans, for example,
are to specify the measures that will be taken by the permittee to monitor, minimize, and mitigate impacts and the funding that will be made
available to implement these measures.
One of the most controversial provisions in HCPs are the inclusion of “no surprises” assurances.157 These are promises made to the
holder of an ITP that if “unforeseen circumstances” arise, the FWS will
not require the commitment of additional land, water, or financial compensation or any additional restrictions beyond the level otherwise
agreed to in the HCP without the consent of the permittee.158 What constitutes “unforeseen circumstances” are negotiated by the parties. The basic posture of the FWS is that “all reasonably foreseeable circumstances,
including natural catastrophes that normally occur in the area, should be
addressed in the HCP,” but such plans must not “address all hypothetical future events, no matter how remote the probability that they may
occur.”159
The no surprises provision is predicated on the belief that several
“changed circumstances” can be adequately planned for in an HCP, such
as the listing of a new species or a catastrophic event in an area prone to
such events. “Unforeseen circumstances,” on the other hand, are those
which could not have been reasonably anticipated, such as the eruption
of Mount St. Helens.160 Though not necessarily labeled as such, trigger
mechanisms are built into HCPs through the negotiation of these
changed circumstances. As discussed below, a non-Federal property

ment voluntary conservation measures for a listed species, will receive assurances that no
additional future regulatory restrictions will be imposed.” Safe Harbor Agreements and
Candidate Conservation Agreements with Assurances, 69 Fed. Reg. 24,084 (May 3, 2004)
(codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 13, 17). Regulatory certainty is also the main incentive behind
Candidate Conservation Agreements with Assurances. These agreements provide “nonFederal property owners who voluntarily agree to manage their lands or waters to remove
threats to candidate or proposed species assurances that their conservation efforts will not
result in future regulatory obligations in excess of those they agree to at the time they enter
into the Agreement.” U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., CANDIDATE CONSERVATION AGREEMENTS
WITH ASSURANCES FOR NON-FEDERAL PROPERTY OWNERS (2002), available at http://library.
fws.gov/pubs9/cca_assurances.pdf; see 69 Fed. Reg. 24,084.
157. See e.g., Spirit of Sage Council v. Norton, 294 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2003); George
F. Wilhere, Adaptive Management in Habitat Conservation Plans, 16 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 20
(2002).
158. Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances, 63 Fed. Reg. 8,859, 8,860 (Feb. 23, 1998)
(codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
159. Id. at 8,863.
160. Id. at 8,868.
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owner holding an ITP will commit to taking particular actions if particular circumstances change.
HCPs now typically include some sort of adaptive management
provision.161 On its face, the two approaches to biodiversity conservation
seem irreconcilable. HCPs, after all, are about providing regulatory certainty, and adaptive management is about responding to change. This
juxtaposition has not gone unnoticed by critics of HCPs and “no surprises” who argue that adaptive management “must allow for adaptations to change as they occur rather than trying to plan for everything up
front.”162 The Services obviously disagree and view adaptive management and monitoring an essential part of habitat conservation planning,
especially when there are significant biological data gaps.
Plum Creek Timber Company Native Fish Habitat Conservation Plan
Plum Creek Timber Company’s Native Fish Habitat Conservation
Plan (NFCHP) covers native salmonids on roughly 1.6 million acres of
Plum Creek timberlands in Montana, Idaho, and Washington. The purpose of the HCP is to “help conserve native salmonids and their ecosystems while conducting commercial timber harvest within a framework of
long-term regulatory certainty and flexibility.”163 An ITP was issued to
Plum Creek for a 30-year term in exchange for a set of conservation commitments and land management prescriptions covering categories such
as roads and upland management, riparian areas, forest management
practices, and land use planning.164
As described by Plum Creek, the NFHCP is a mixture of a complex science plan and a business agreement designed to give the Company long-term business predictability.165 Adaptive management is
incorporated into the Plan in such a way that the agreement outlines “the
range of possible adjustments and circumstances under which these adjustments would be triggered.”166 Triggers are selected in the NFHCP because they serve as “early warning indicator[s] of results that may be

161. U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR & U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANINCIDENTAL TAKE PERMIT PROCESSING HANDBOOK, at 3-24 (1996).
162. Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances, 63 Fed. Reg. at 8,863.
163. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT AND NATIVE FISH HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN VOL. 1 (2000), at ES1.
164. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. ET AL., RECORD OF DECISION: PROPOSED ISSUANCE OF A PERMIT
TO PLUM CREEK TIMBER CO., AUTHORIZING INCIDENTAL TAKE OF NATIVE FISH IN MONTANA,
IDAHO, AND WASHINGTON (2000).
165. Id. at 8.
166. PLUM CREEK TIMBER CO., FINAL PLUM CREEK TIMBER COMPANY NATIVE FISH HABITAT
CONSERVATION PLAN, at 1-2 (2000).
NING AND
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biologically relevant.”167 Instead of counting fish, the triggers use a set of
measurable habitat variables that are supposed to serve as a proxy for
biological health.
Some triggers specified in the Plan trip non-discretionary, preidentified steps or “management responses” required by Plum Creek. In
other cases, triggers are used to initiate “mandatory collaborative management responses.” The latter are not specifically described in the
NFHCP but are to be collaboratively developed by Plum Creek and the
Services. It is within this process that some triggers can be either
strengthened or relaxed based on new information and agreement by the
parties. As viewed by Plum Creek, adaptive management is a “two-way
street” in habitat conservation planning.168 That is, “information and experience obtained from research and monitoring may suggest the applicant can meet biological objectives with more, or less, restrictive
conservation measures.”169
The adaptive management commitments by Plum Creek are specified in matrix form, with a column of triggers followed by a column of
applicable management responses. So, for example, if a “statistically significant increase of 1.0° C in stream temperature relative to pre-treatment
conditions is observed,” the management response is to “revise or create
riparian prescription enhancements” that are based upon an earlier evaluation.170 In other parts of the Plan triggers are used in a more general
and curious fashion. Take, for example, the Plan’s goal to fence one hundred percent of severely impacted stream reaches by the ninth year of
the Plan. In this case a trigger is used so that if less than fifty percent of
stream reaches are fenced by the sixth year, the identified management
response is to simply “increase rate of fencing to achieve 100 percent by
the end of year 9.”171
Several conservation groups find fault with Plum Creek’s HCP.
Much of their criticism stems from the belief that the Plan’s conservation
commitments are biologically and legally insufficient, vague, and not
certain to happen. Trout Unlimited (TU) asks for more sensitive triggers
to be used and for them to be defined in more quantitative terms.172

167. Id. at 8-7.
168. Id. at 8-11.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 8-19. This trigger is further explained to be a “statistically significant (alpha=0.1) increase of 1.0°C in maximum weekly average temperature based on a pooling of
all measured sites.” Id. at 8-25.
171. Id. at 8-20.
172. TROUT UNLIMITED, PRINCIPAL FINDINGS OF TROUT UNLIMITED’S REVIEW OF THE PROPOSED PLUM CREEK NATIVE FISH HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN (Mar. 17, 2000) (on file with
authors)
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Some of the conservation commitments found in the Plan, says TU, such
as promises to use best management practices are either not measurable
or are things that are already being practiced.173 The Pacific Rivers Council specifically focuses on the HCP’s “unprecedented and unjustifiable
level of reliance on Adaptive Management mechanisms.”174 Core to its
concerns about the HCP is how adaptive management is used as a substitute for a more precautionary approach to species conservation.
We pick up this issue again in Part IV, but important to this critique is where triggers are set and how the burden of proof is established. The problem, as the Council sees it, is that the HCP’s “scientific
questions revolve around the hypothesis that harmful change is not occurring in the ecosystem.”175 The Council believes the triggers in the HCP
essentially ask “scientists to take a very noisy and structurally complex
system, with a relatively small sample size, and demonstrate some ‘undesirable’ trend in the data before remedial management action will be
considered.”176 The adaptive approach, according to the Council, does
not account for the full spectrum of uncertainties inherent in Plum
Creek’s HCP. The Plan’s design, it says, does more to ensure certainty
for Plum Creek’s business interests than it does for the covered
species.177
Running throughout the HCP, says the Council, is an unfounded
optimism that adaptive management can be used to easily reverse adverse changes to habitat and fish. This is problematic, it says, because of
the biological time-lags between management activity and biological responses. And even if quickly identified and measured, says the Council,
“many of the most important adverse changes cannot be effectively reversed through any known management intervention.”178 What the
Council would like instead is a more risk-averse approach that prioritizes the conservation needs of salmonids.

173. Letter from Bruce Farling, Trout Unlimited, to Ted Koch (Mar. 16, 2000) (on file
with authors) (regarding comments on proposed Plum Creek NFHCP and DEIS).
174. Letter from Mary Scurlock, Pac. Rivers Council, to Thomas Dwer, William Stelle,
Jr., Ted Koch & Bob Ries (Mar. 17, 2011) (on file with authors) (regarding Plum Creek
Native Fish Habitat Conservation Plan).
175. CHRIS FRISSELL ET AL., AN ECOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE PLUM CREEK NATIVE FISH
HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN 24v (Pac. Rivers Council, Mar. 17, 2000) (on file with
authors).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 26.
178. Id. at 24.
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D. State Wolf Management Plans for ESA Delisting
Montana and Idaho wrote state wolf management plans that
would be implemented upon the delisting of wolves from the ESA in the
Northern Rocky Mountains.179 The delisting rule requires at least ten
breeding pairs and at least 100 wolves for three consecutive years in
three core recovery areas: northwestern Montana, central Idaho, and the
Greater Yellowstone Area. This is a recovery standard as first used in the
1987 Wolf Recovery Plan.180 In order to delist wolves in the Northern
Rockies, the USFWS required the writing of state wolf management
plans that will serve as an “adequate regulatory mechanism,” one of the
five delisting requirements of the ESA.181
Unlike Wyoming, the states of Montana and Idaho wrote wolf
plans that were deemed sufficient by the USFWS.182 Both plans invoke
adaptive management and use population-based triggers to initiate different types of wolf management upon delisting . Montana’s Department
of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks uses an “adaptive management trigger” in its
state wolf management plan.183 A minimum of fifteen breeding pairs of
wolves is the trigger point requiring the agency to manage the wolf population more conservatively or liberally. More conservative management
strategies would be used by the agency as the number of breeding pairs
decreases and approaches the fifteen mark. In contrast, management
strategies would become more liberal with increasing numbers of breeding pairs. The agency lays out the types of management required when
numbers are above or below the fifteen pair trigger. For example, no
hunting or trapping of wolves is allowed when there are fewer than fifteen breeding pairs of wolves in the state, and regulated hunting and
trapping is permitted when over this mark. The control of wolves is also
179. Final Rule to Identify the Northern Rocky Mountain Population of Gray Wolf as a
Distinct Population Segment and to Revise the List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 74 Fed. Reg. 15,123 (Apr. 2, 2009) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
180. Id. at 15,130, 15,131. If written, the ESA requires recovery plans to include “objective, measurable criteria which, when met, would result in a determination, in accordance
with the provisions of this section, that the species be removed from the list . . .” 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533 (f)(1) (2006).
181. 16 U.S.C. §1533(a)(1) (2006); 50 C.F.R. §424.11(c) (2010).
182. See Final Rule to Identify the Northern Rocky Mountain Population of Gray Wolf
as a Distinct Population Segment and to Revise the List of Endangered and Threatened
Wildlife, 74 Fed. Reg. at 15,124; Defenders of Wildlife v. Hall, 565 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (D.
Mont. 2008) (finding Wyoming’s wolf plan an inadequate regulatory mechanism because it
classifies wolves as predators that are subject to unregulated killing across roughly 90 percent of the state and that Wyoming’s Plan only commits the state to managing for 7 breeding pairs of wolves outside National Parks).
183. MONT. FISH, WILDLIFE & PARKS, MONTANA WOLF CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT
PLAN: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 74 (2004).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMN\52-2\NMN207.txt

Fall 2012]

unknown

Seq: 41

ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT

10-DEC-12

14:45

483

determined by the fifteen pack trigger, with more liberal lethal removal
of problem wolves allowed when the number is greater than fifteen.
Idaho’s wolf management plan similarly uses a “management
trigger” or “threshold” based on the number of breeding pairs of wolves
in the state.184 These range from a “FWS threshold” or bare minimum of
<10 breeding pairs which signals a status review for ESA relisting to a
“hunting threshold” where annual harvest of wolves is allowed when
>20 breeding pairs are in the state. In between are additional thresholds
requiring the state to be more restrictive in controlling wolves and intensifying monitoring efforts among other actions.
Environmental plaintiffs challenged the delisting rule and faulted
state wolf management plans as part of the problem. Most of their criticism stems from the belief that the USFWS’s wolf recovery goal is woefully inadequate and not based on “best available science,” as required
by the ESA. Instead of a dated 30 breeding pair/300 wolf standard, these
groups emphasize science suggesting that a “connected population of
2,000-5,000 wolves is necessary to ensure a genetically viable northern
Rockies wolf population over the long term.”185 Plaintiffs and other critics are arguing, in effect, that the Montana and Idaho plans, and their
breeding pair triggers, are inadequate because they proceed from the
federal government’s problematic 30/300 wolf threshold, a threshold
that they see as biologically indefensible.186
Earthjustice, who represented environmental groups in the litigation, also argues that “the states’ wolf management plans are largely
vague and unenforceable, making no representations as to the number of
wolves that will be protected and offering few guarantees as to the actions that will (and will not) be taken in pursuit of the states’ management goals.”187 For Earthjustice, the FWS’s “reliance upon Montana’s and
Idaho’s unenforceable wolf management guidance documents evinces a
failure to distinguish between regulatory and non-regulatory mechanisms.”188 Montana refutes this claim, though it does not directly address
184. IDAHO DEPT. OF FISH & GAME, IDAHO WOLF POPULATION MANAGEMENT PLAN, 20082012 at 19 (2008).
185. Earthjustice’s Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Defenders of Wildlife et al., v. Salazar, Case No. CV-09-77-M-DWM (D. Mont. June 2, 2009).
186. See e.g., Bradley J. Bergstrom et al., The Northern Rocky Mountain Gray Wolf is Not
Yet Recovered, 59 BIOSCIENCE 991 (2009).
187. Letter from the Fed. List of Endangered & Threatened Wildlife to Dirk
Kempthorne and H. Dale Hall, Earthjustice (Feb. 27, 2008) (on file with authors) (regarding
notice of violations of the Endangered Species Act in designating the Northern Rocky
Mountain population of the Gray Wolf as a distinct population segment and removing that
distinct population segment).
188. Earthjustice’s Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 34, Defenders of
Wildlife et al., v. Salazar, Case No. CV-09-77-M-DWM (June 2, 2009).
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the issue of whether or not the State’s Wolf Conservation and Management Plan is in fact enforceable. Instead the State argues that the plan
must be understood in its larger regulatory context, and that it is consistent with applicable and legally binding state constitutional provisions,
statute, rules, and policies and that these “regulatory mechanisms provide strong, multi-layered protection for the wolf.”189
Also a concern is the tenuous standing of these plans in light of
various wolf management resolutions, state “defense of property” laws,
and proposed bills in both state legislatures.190 Some legislation, if enacted, would undermine the wolf plans, and their introduction has created some concern about the permanence of these plans.
The certainty of these plans being implemented absent adequate
funding is another concern by Earthjustice and others commenting on
the wolf-delisting rule. The state plans lack guaranteed sources of funding, a problem partly caused by the withdrawal of most federal dollars
once the species is delisted. Without such funds, some groups question
whether or not the plans will be implemented.191 In countering, the
USFWS acknowledges the inherent uncertainties of appropriations, but
nonetheless believes that the states are committed to secure the necessary
funding to implement the plans.192
E. Rocky Mountain National Park Elk and Vegetation Management
Plan
In 2007 the National Park Service issued a final environmental impact statement for the “Rocky Mountain National Park Elk and Vegetation Management Plan.”193 Elk numbers in the Park were at carrying
capacity and having deleterious effects on vegetation communities, including aspen, willow, and upland herbaceous communities. The presence of elk also was crowding out beavers, causing changes to the
hydrology in riparian areas, with further negative impacts on riparian
willow communities. In the absence of natural predators, elk were less
189. Mont. & Mont. Dept. of Fish, Wildlife & Parks’ Brief Opposing Plaintiffs’ Motion
for Preliminary Injunction at 2, Defenders of Wildlife, et al., v. Hall, Case No. CV-08-56-MDWM (May 16, 2008).
190. Final Rule to Identify the Northern Rocky Mountain Population of Gray Wolf as a
Distinct Population Segment and to Revise the List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 74 Fed. Reg. 15,123, 15,149–150 (Apr. 2, 2009) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
191. Letter from the Fed. List of Endangered & Threatened Wildlife, supra note 187, at 5.
192. Final Rule to Identify the Northern Rocky Mountain Population of Gray Wolf as a
Distinct Population Segment and to Revise the List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 74 Fed. Reg. at 15,151.
193. NAT’L PARK SERV., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ELK AND VEGETATION
MANAGEMENT PLAN, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NATIONAL PARK (2007).
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mobile than they would have been historically, causing increased damage to vegetation communities. Between 1997-2001 the elk community
reached numbers of 2800-3500 animals, whereas under natural conditions populations would likely be between 1200-2100 animals.194
The NPS’ Record of Decision was issued in 2008, and the selected
alternative includes culling of elk populations to maintain them at the
higher end of their range of natural variation.195 Given that elk numbers
are to be maintained at relatively high levels, the alternative also includes fencing of some vegetation communities to promote their recovery. The selected alternative also includes the potential use of fertility
control agents, methods for redistributing elk, and possible reintroduction of wolves.196
A key component of the Management Plan is a monitoring and
adaptive management framework. In the 2007 EIS, the NPS explains,
“Monitoring and evaluation are crucial in determining whether management actions are achieving objectives. . .. This process of using information as it becomes available to alter management actions is called
adaptive management. Adaptive management is an iterative process that
requires selecting and implementing management actions, careful monitoring, comparing results with objectives, and using feedback to make
future management decisions.”197
There is a control/treatment framework in place, with monitoring
occurring in fenced and non-fenced areas, in core ranges versus non-core
ranges, and compared to baseline conditions, which allows for some
causal inference of factors affecting vegetation conditions.198
The monitoring framework has several primary purposes.199 One
is to determine if management actions are making progress towards desired conditions. Other goals are to model elk populations to guide annual removal rates and to gather data for model improvement. The steps
of this process include, first, extensive collection of baseline data. Next,
desired future conditions are established for elk and vegetation. Management actions are then applied, followed by monitoring to ensure progress towards desired conditions and to be sure the actual impacts, for
194. Id. at iv.
195. NAT’L PARK SERV., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ELK AND VEGETATION
MANAGEMENT PLAN, RECORD OF DECISION, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NATIONAL PARK (2008).
196. Id.
197. NAT’L PARK SERV., supra note 193, at 53.
198. LINDA C. ZEIGENFUSS ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, OPEN-FILE REPORT 2011-1013,
MONITORING PLAN FOR VEGETATION RESPONSES TO ELK MANAGEMENT IN ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NATIONAL PARK (2011).
199. NAT’L PARK SERV., supra note 195, at 10-1 (These are outlined in the Record of
Decision).
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example to factors such as visitor experience, are within ranges analyzed
in the EIS. Monitoring tracks whether these goals are being met and then
adjustments will be made if there is no progress towards the desired
future conditions. Adjustments for vegetation, for example, might include increased or decreased fencing of plant communities, increased redistribution or aversive conditioning, and fertility control of elk, among
other things.200
The EIS includes several indicators with thresholds that are evaluated to determine whether management actions are successful or need to
be altered.201 For example, for aspen, the desired future condition is a
distribution of stems of ~75 percent small diameter, ~20 percent medium
diameter, and ~5 percent large diameter and regeneration in at least 45
percent of stands each decade. The indicator is the number of stems/
acre. In the case of riparian willow, the desired future condition is 70
percent willow cover in suitable habitat, although the NPS acknowledges
that this will not be possible to accomplish in the 20 year life of the plan.
Indicators are consumption/offtake, percent cover, and structure.
In 2011, based on additional collection of baseline monitoring
data, thresholds were refined from those in the original EIS and fleshed
out in detail in the “Monitoring Plan for Vegetation Responses to Elk
Management in Rocky Mountain National Park.”202 Desired future conditions and indicators are the same, but thresholds were updated to reflect
baseline conditions. For example, the threshold for aspen is, “Progressive
increase in aspen regeneration above the [baseline] level of 13%. . . . Progressive shift in the distribution of stem size toward the desired future
condition.”203 For willow the threshold is no net increase in offtake above
the baseline level of 35 percent and increase in cover and height above
the baseline levels of 21 percent and .9m, respectively.204
These thresholds represent baseline conditions before implementation of the new elk management plan, and monitoring will be conducted every 5 years to ensure that progress is made towards desired
conditions.205 If not, management actions will be adjusted within the flexible parameters set in the selected alternative. Importantly, the language
in the EIS is written in a way that constitutes a clear commitment. For
example, the section on monitoring response of aspen communities
states, “As a result of monitoring the indicators defined. . .management

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

More details are provided in the EIS. NAT’L PARK SERV., supra note 193, at 52-3.
Id. at 57.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.
NAT’L PARK SERV., supra note 195, at 35.
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actions would be adjusted to ensure that progress is made toward
achieving desired future conditions.”206 It is clear that monitoring results
will be evaluated every 5 years, although the timeframe for implementing mitigation measures is less clear. As explained above, desired conditions are quantified and measurable, and the threshold establishes
baseline conditions before implementation of the plan, essentially serving as a baseline against which progress can be measured.
F. Northwest Forest Plan
In 1994 the USDA and USDI jointly published a record of decision
(ROD) that amended the land management plans on all forested public
lands managed by the U.S. Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management within the range of the Northern Spotted Owl (Strix occidentalis).207 This ROD, with amendments, still applies to land
management plans in Washington, Oregon, and California and is commonly known as the Northwest Forest Plan (NWFP). The NWFP has
been hailed as one of the foremost examples of adaptive management
embedded within a large-scale land management plan.208
The primary components of the NWFP are 1) land allocations
with associated standards and guidelines for each type of allocation, 2)
an aquatic conservation strategy to improve watershed health over time,
3) a comprehensive monitoring program, including pre-implementation
surveys for some species, post-project implementation monitoring, and
effectiveness and validation monitoring, and 4) the creation of adaptive
management areas (AMAs).209 The AMAs thus far have not been particularly successful, and therefore they are not the focus of this discussion.210
However, consideration of the other aspects of the NWFP sheds some
light on how triggers are used in the NWFP.
Management triggers are not a prominent aspect of the NWFP,
but, as we will see, there is some use of triggers or thresholds. In their
discussion of the design of an effectiveness monitoring program for the
NWFP, Barry Noon and others write that the lack of trigger points tied to
a change in management action has historically been a weakness of mon-

206. NAT’L PARK SERV., supra note 193, at 56.
207. NWFP ROD, supra note 90.
208. See e.g., Ruhl & Fishman, supra note 7; Bernard T. Bormann et al., Adaptive Management of Forest Ecosystems: Did Some Rubber Hit the Road? 57 BIOSCIENCE 189 (2007).
209. NWFP ROD, supra note 90.
210. See Bormann et al., supra note 208; George H. Stankey, et al., Adaptive Management
and the Northwest Forest Plan: Rhetoric and Reality, 40 J. FORESTRY 101 (2003).
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itoring programs.211 They explain that absent decision thresholds or triggers, management is disconnected from monitoring. Despite this
affirmation of the need for management triggers, the team concludes it is
too complex of an issue to address for the NWFP effectiveness monitoring program at the time this document was prepared, in 1999, but is
something to be addressed and improved over time.212 Therefore, the effectiveness monitoring program for the NWFP does not include specific
management triggers. For example, there is no provision that states if
Northern Spotted Owl populations reach a certain level, then management will be changed in a particular fashion. In their review of the progress of adaptive management under the NWFP after the first 10 years,
Bormann and others write, “The questions posed by the monitoring program could have been more relevant to the unfolding decisions. . .,” and
they explain that one improvement would be the addition of quantitative
expectations.213
Nonetheless there are some types of thresholds that exist as part
of the NWFP. These are discussed in turn below and include 1) assumptions within the effects analysis of the final environmental impact statement for the NWFP, 2) the use of a baseline for comparison as part of the
Aquatic Conservation Strategy (ACS), 3) standards and guidelines of the
NWFP, and 4) survey and manage requirements that in some cases trigger certain monitoring and mitigation actions.
If the effects analysis in a NEPA document sets limits on predicted
effects, these may effectively serve as triggers when the NEPA document
covers long-term, ongoing actions, such as in the case of the NWFP. For
example, the NWFP FEIS predicted no more than a 5 percent loss of
Northern Spotted Owl habitat; monitoring after 15 years of implementation shows that losses of habitat are <1 percent, or less than what was
predicted in the FEIS.214 If monitoring had shown that effects were
outside the range of predicted effects in a programmatic EIS such as the
NWFP this would trigger supplemental analysis under NEPA and likely
force such analysis before any further actions were undertaken.
Standards and guidelines also can act as types of triggers. The
NWFP’s ACS includes riparian reserves, designation of key watersheds,
watershed analysis, and watershed restoration.215 Agencies must imple211. Barry R. Noon et al., Conceptual Basis for Designing an Effectiveness Monitoring Program, in BARRY S. MULDER ET AL., THE STRATEGY AND DESIGN OF THE EFFECTIVENESS MONITORING PROGRAM FOR THE NORTHWEST FOREST PLAN, GEN. TECH. REP. NO. 437 (1999).
212. Id. at 40.
213. Bormann et al., supra note 208, at 189.
214. RAY DAVIS ET AL., NORTHWEST FOREST PLAN-THE FIRST 15 YEARS [1994-2008]: SUMMARY OF KEY MONITORING FINDINGS 2–3 (2011).
215. See NWFP ROD, supra note 90, at B-12.
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ment the ACS in order to maintain existing conditions or improve degraded conditions.216 Projects cannot go forward that do not promote or
that prevent attainment of the ACS objectives. However, there are no
quantified thresholds under the ACS (although other water quality
thresholds may apply in the plan area that are associated with Clean
Water Act or Endangered Species Act compliance). Rather, the ACS
works as a set of standards and guidelines constraining planned actions
under the NWFP. Effects on watersheds are compared to baseline conditions when the NWFP was implemented, and maintenance or improvement is expected in comparison to those baseline conditions. Other
standards and guidelines under the NWFP trigger specific actions. For
example, in the “matrix” lands, which are the allocated lands where the
vast majority of timber harvest can occur, in watersheds with less than 15
percent late-successional forest remaining, a watershed analysis is required prior to harvesting of additional late-successional stands.217 In this
case, prior logging in a watershed might trigger this additional analysis.
Finally, survey and manage protocols under the NWFP also act as
a type of trigger.218 These protocols apply to approximately 400 species of
amphibians, mammals, bryophytes, mollusks, vascular plants, fungi,
lichens, and arthropods. Under the original survey and manage protocols, species generally fell into one of four categories, and more than one
category could apply to the same species. The first category required
management of known sites (essentially protection of acres and the use
of management guidelines around known points of occurrence). The second category required surveys prior to ground-disturbing activities. For
most of the history of survey and manage, the red tree vole (Arborimus
longicaudus), a prey species for northern spotted owls, fell into this category. If the species was found prior to ground-disturbing activities, mitigation requirements and management activities were triggered to protect
the species in that location. Other species were in a category that required extensive surveys to identify high priority sites. A final category
required general regional surveys for species whose status was highly
uncertain; the purpose of these surveys was to collect additional information to determine if protection is needed and to inform management
strategies. The approach, unprecedented in scope, was meant to reduce
uncertainty and “assess new information under an adaptive manage-

216. Id. at B-9 to B-10.
217. Id. at E-5.
218. Id. at C-4.
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ment approach for evaluating needs for conservation and protection of
the species.”219
Jack Ward Thomas chaired the original Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team (FEMAT), which designed the Northwest Forest
Plan; in a review of the NWFP he explains that survey and manage protocols were never part of Option 9, the management option identified by
FEMAT that was selected by President Clinton as the administration’s
preferred approach.220 According to Thomas, in the final EIS, the agencies decided to include survey and manage in the selected alternative for
the NWFP, likely because they anticipated the plan would not survive
legal challenge without it. Thomas explains that the effect of survey and
manage was a dramatically different outcome than what the FEMAT anticipated under Option 9, and in fact more closely resembled Option 1,
which the team referred to as “the green dream,” in which all old-growth
forest was protected.221 Thomas explains that if sensitive species were
found in pre-disturbance surveys, mitigation measures were supposed to
be triggered. As a result, he writes, “In most cases, the proposed sale was
simply dropped from consideration.”222 This, Thomas explains, is one
reason the timber outputs under the NWFP have been significantly less
than what was predicted by the FEMAT and in the FEIS. Others note that
pre-disturbance surveys were the most contentious part of the program
and required more resources and time than originally anticipated.223
Since 2000, the Clinton and Bush administration have pursued a
number of changes to survey and manage protocols, with an attendant
array of lawsuits and legal settlements. The parties are currently in settlement discussions, and the current status of survey and manage is a
combination of the original guidelines, changes from the 2001 Record of
Decision modifying the survey and manage protocols, and other
amendments.224
Some of the primary legal challenges to the NWFP revolved
around whether the management approaches for northern spotted owls
and aquatic resources provided enough certainty as to whether resources
would be protected. For example, the agencies in their FEIS predicted an

219. Randy Molina et. al., Protecting Rare, Old-Growth, Forest-Associated Species under the
Survey and Manage Program Guidelines of the Northwest Forest Plan, 20 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 306, 310 (2006).
220. JACK WARD THOMAS, SUSTAINABILITY OF THE NORTHWEST FOREST PLAN—DYNAMIC
VS. STATIC MANAGEMENT (2011), available at www.fs.fed.us/r5/nwfp/plans/sus.shtml.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Molina et al., supra note 219, at 311.
224. Survey and Manage, DEP’T OF INTERIOR BUREAU OF LAND MGMT, http://www.blm.
gov/or/plans/surveyandmanage (last updated Jan. 2012).
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80 percent or greater likelihood of maintaining viability for all but three
species, with a ~20 percent likelihood of extinction in the long run.225 In
light of the presence of significant scientific uncertainty as to both the
status of some species and the effects of current and anticipated management strategies, the presence of a monitoring plan was crucial to the success of the NWFP in court. In his decision upholding the NWFP, Judge
Dwyer writes, “Monitoring is central to the plan’s validity. If it is not
funded, or not done for any reason, the plan will have to be
reconsidered.”226
IV. ANALYIS
Throughout the cases examined in sections II and III, several persistent issues surface as some of the primary themes and challenges associated with triggers in adaptive management plans. For instance, are
these examples of “real” adaptive management or something else that is
inappropriately labeled as such? How enforceable and binding are these
adaptive management plans? When it comes to monitoring and mitigation, how do we ensure it occurs, who pays for it, and who does it? How
is NEPA navigated and who sets the triggers in these plans? In this section we provide in-depth analysis of the primary issues that arise as a
result of our investigation into the use of triggers.
A. Adaptive Management or Adaptive Mitigation?
Rather than adaptive management, the terms “adaptive mitigation” and “contingency planning” are more accurate ways to describe
most of the cases in Part III. Each case emphasizes uncertainty and the
importance of monitoring, among other central principles of adaptive
management, but they are generally not designed as hypothesis-driven
experiments that will necessarily reduce uncertainty and promote learning. Instead, the main emphasis is to monitor conditions and adapt actions over time. This type of adaptive mitigation is more common in the
cases reviewed, but that is not to say that no learning is occurring.
In some cases, such as that of Rocky Mountain National Park’s Elk
and Vegetation Management Plan, monitoring includes a detailed plan
and design with control plots, allowing for some causal inference and
comparison across different types of treatment areas.227 Although such

225. See Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (upholding the NWFP); Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401 (9th Cir. 1996).
226. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. at 1324.
227. See LINDA C. ZEIGENFUSS, THERESE JOHNSON & ZACHARY WIEBE, MONITORING PLAN
FOR VEGETATION RESPONSES TO ELK MANAGEMENT IN ROCKY MOUNTAIN NATIONAL PARK,
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plans may not be primarily set up to test alternate hypotheses, there is
some knowledge generation that goes beyond a kind of adaptive
mitigation.
However, in other cases, although monitoring is incorporated, the
opportunities for understanding causality are limited, and the primary
focus is on adapting practices if conditions are less-than-desirable, even
if our understanding of what is causing such resource conditions is not
necessarily improved. What is more, in some cases the link between
monitoring information and adapting management actions is not entirely
clear. In other words, plans do not always make it explicit what will
happen once a trigger is pulled in response to monitoring information. In
such cases, monitoring and mitigation can be an inefficient use of everyone’s time. This point has not been lost on the public. One observer
writes:
Under current practice, cookie cutter mitigation is typically
applied in decision records and the agencies require operators
to bear the expense of monitoring to prove that their mitigation is working. No triggers or feedback mechanisms are defined. In the BLM’s [adaptive management] approach, for
example, monitoring plans are designed to gather an entire
universe of data without regard to cause of the effects
monitored.228

To be fair, some definitional and operational variation of adaptive
management is to be expected. In the context of habitat conservation
planning, for example, the Services recognize how their broad approach
to adaptive management differs from how the term is used in the scientific literature. But they note that the term “is used in many other disciplines and contexts and has different meanings to different people.”229
The Services thus distinguish between experimental-based adaptive
management, which can be difficult in the context of the ESA,230 and
types of contingency planning that may or may not include adaptive

U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR & U.S. GEO. SURVEY (2011), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2011/
1013/pdf/OF11-1013.pdf.
228. Letter from Clair M. Moseley, Exec. Dir., Public Lands Advocacy to Ted Boling,
Attorney, Senior Council, at 5 (May 22, 2010) (on file with author).
229. Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,242, 35,245 (June 1,
2000).
230. See DONALD LUDWIG & CARL J. WALTERS, FITTING POPULATION VIABILITY ANALYSIS
INTO ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT, POPULATION VIABILITY ANALYSIS (Steven R. Beissinger & Dale
R. McCullough eds., 2002) (suggesting that experimental adaptive management approaches
to endangered species will be infrequent).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMN\52-2\NMN207.txt

Fall 2012]

unknown

Seq: 51

ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT

10-DEC-12

14:45

493

management. As discussed in Part III, contingency planning is used by
the Services when negotiating “changed circumstances” in an ITP. These
are “circumstances that can be reasonably anticipated, and the HCP can
incorporate measures to be implemented if the circumstances occur.”231
As explained by the Services, “This flexibility also allows previously
agreed upon management and/or mitigation actions to be implemented
or discontinued, as needed, in response to changed circumstances.”232
The Pinedale oil and gas case is a good example of what is primarily a kind of adaptive mitigation, as its “wildlife monitoring and mitigation matrix” serves as a trigger for various management actions. This is
when agencies incorporate adaptive mechanisms “specifying in advance
an expected range of uncertainties and offering a corresponding range of
mitigation measures, to be triggered and adjusted in response to actual
impacts subsequently revealed by monitoring data.”233 In some cases, the
concepts of adaptive mitigation and contingency planning are often interchangeable because some contingency plans include built-in mitigation measures. Recall, for instance, the FCRPS Adaptive Management
Implementation Plan in which biological triggers are used to activate
short and long-term contingency actions.
What’s the point, though, of making all these distinctions between
the various types of projects agencies call “adaptive management?” We
take two primary lessons from the cases. First, there should be some
truth in advertising. Members of the public may have a particular idea of
what constitutes adaptive management. If an agency advances something that is really just contingency planning, but is packaged as adaptive management, this can appear disingenuous and erode trust in
already contentious contexts. Secondly, if so-called adaptive management plans fail to make the link between monitoring information, action,
and learning, then there is genuine cause for concern or at least some
attention. Key questions arise such as: will any learning occur or is there
a lost opportunity to reduce uncertainty about the ecosystem? And, is
there a feedback loop to tie learning, or at least monitoring information,
back into revised planning and actual management changes? These are
critical questions and reasons why it is important to be discerning about
what exactly is taking place under the umbrella of “adaptive
management.”

231. Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. at 35,253 .
232. Id.
233. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Towards a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 945 (2002).
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B. Enforceability of Promised Monitoring and Mitigation Actions
One of the most challenging issues emerging in these cases is the
question of whether monitoring and mitigation commitments are enforceable and certain to occur. What if promises are made to conduct
monitoring or undertake mitigation and these promises simply are not
kept? When are they enforceable? This is a fundamental issue: if monitoring and triggers are meant to add a level of accountability to adaptive
management plans, then we likely want to know how much accountability we are actually getting. In this section we address the requirements
regarding mitigation measures, which often are triggered by, and therefore inextricably linked to, monitoring information, and more generally
the enforceability of monitoring, mitigation, and other commitments in
Records of Decision.
1. The Enforceability of Mitigation Commitments in a Record of
Decision
Part III shows how agencies often use triggers to initiate a range
of mitigation measures. These mitigation “commitments” are made in resource management plans, biological opinions, habitat conservation
plans, and various NEPA-related documents. There are a number of
things to consider about commitments to mitigate when they are made
in agency decisions. In the NEPA context, mitigation measures are not
necessarily legally binding. In preparing EIS alternatives, NEPA’s implementing regulations require agencies to “include appropriate mitigation
measures not already included in the proposed action or alternatives.”234
However, agencies are not required under NEPA to implement mitigation measures that are discussed in an EIS.235 At the same time, mitigation measures committed to as part of the ROD in an EIS are potentially
legally binding, as will be discussed more below.
Mitigation measures are scrutinized more closely when agencies
make mitigation promises as a way to justify a finding of no significant
impact (FONSI) in lieu of preparing an EIS. Though most agencies do not
call them as such, the “mitigated-FONSI” is used by agencies when they
reduce project impacts below the NEPA “significance” threshold by ad-

234. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(f) (2010). The regulations define mitigation to include: a) avoiding the impact altogether by not taking a certain action or parts of an action, b) minimizing
impacts by limiting the degree or magnitude of the action and its implementation, c) rectifying the impact by repairing, rehabilitating, or restoring the affected environment, d) reducing or eliminating the impact over time by preservation and maintenance operations
during the life of the action, and e) compensating for the impact by replacing or providing
substitute resources or environments. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.20 (2010).
235. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 322, 352–53 (1989).
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ding mitigation measures to the original proposed action. Though they
can be controversial, mitigated-FONSIs offer a possible way for agencies
to navigate NEPA in a more streamlined fashion, by avoiding significant
impacts up-front. However, although it is not required, follow-up monitoring would ideally occur to confirm that predictions of non-significance were accurate. The CEQ recommends that monitoring occur in
“important” cases, and especially where uncertain mitigation approaches
support a mitigated FONSI.236 The CEQ “approves the use of the ‘mitigated FONSI’ when the NEPA process results in enforceable mitigation
measures.”237
Several legal observers outline the broad parameters provided by
the courts when it comes to reviewing mitigation measures when they
justify the issuance of a mitigated FONSI.238 First, agencies must “convincingly establish” that mitigation will succeed in reducing impacts below the NEPA significance threshold.239 “Inchoate or speculative
mitigation measures” have been rejected by the courts.240 They have also
demanded “more than mere vague statements of good intentions” and
have “rejected reliance on measures demonstrably unlikely to be enforced.”241 All the same, courts have not “required absolute certainty or
any binding legal commitment to mitigation measures.”242 The general
judicial trend is to require a “moderately high level of assurance” that
mitigation measures will be performed, with the recognition that funding for monitoring and mitigation often must materialize after the decision point has passed.243
In 2011 guidance on monitoring and mitigation, CEQ says that
agencies “should not commit to mitigation. . .unless they have sufficient
legal authorities and expect there will be necessary resources available to

236. Council on Envtl. Quality, Final Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies
on the Appropriate Use of Mitigation and Monitoring and Clarifying the Appropriate Use
of Mitigated Findings of No Significant Impact, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,843, 3,849 (Jan 14, 2011)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 1500–02, 1505 –08) [hereinafter CEQ Final Guidance on Mitigation and Monitoring] (stating that “an agency should also commit to mitigation monitoring
in important cases when relying upon an EA and mitigated FONSI”).
237. Id. at 3,848.
238. See Albert I. Herson, Project Mitigation Revisited: Most Courts Approve Findings of No
Significant Impact Justified by Mitigation, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 72 (1986); Dave Owen, Probabilities, Planning Failures, and Environmental Law, 84 TULANE L. REV. 265 (2009).
239. Owen, supra note 238 (citing Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir.
1988)).
240. Id. (citing O’Reilly v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’r, 477 F.3d 225, 234 (5th Cir. 2007)).
241. Id. (citing Audubon Soc’y of Cent. Ark. v. Dailey, 977 F.2d 428, 435–36 (8th Cir.
1992)).
242. Id.
243. Id.
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perform or ensure the performance of the mitigation.”244 This authority
may come from the agency itself or from another legal requirement or
statute. An agency may commit to a mitigation alternative in an EA or
EIS; in general, the CEQ recommends that mitigation commitments be
clearly identified in the appropriate decision documents and “should be
carefully specified in terms of measurable performance standards or expected results, so as to establish clear performance expectations.”245 In
essence, the message is that the agency should have the authority and a
high degree of certainty that it will perform any promised mitigation
measures, and these measures should be enforceable in some way. A key
challenge is having enough precision in mitigation goals and commitments to determine whether they have been implemented and
successful.
However, there is ample confusion as to when mitigation measures as promised in a ROD for an EA with a FONSI or an EIS constitute
legally binding and enforceable commitments.246 This question was
raised in several of the case studies. Those participating in these
processes often asked for greater assurances that if pulled, triggers
would initiate mandatory and enforceable mitigation measures. Several
environmental groups asked for the use of triggers and thresholds in the
Pinedale case for example, but they also wanted more certainty that the
corresponding mitigation measures would be “clearly specified, adequately funded, and enforceable.”247 In their critiques of the current approach, they stated, “These vague and potentially nonbinding provisions
are insufficient to meet BLM’s obligations under NEPA,” and “[t]his is
especially true because BLM has a history of not fulfilling its mitigation
commitment on the Pinedale Anticline.”248 In comments on CEQ’s draft
guidance on monitoring and mitigation, one observer notes, “[T]here is
some confusion as to whether mitigation commitments made in a record
of decision (ROD) are legally enforceable. While the regulation at 40
C.F.R. §1505.3 provides that, ‘Mitigation. . .and other condi-

244. CEQ Final Guidance on Mitigation and Monitoring, supra 236, at 3,847.
245. Id. at 3,848.
246. The 2003 NEPA Task Force asked for CEQ guidance on this issue and surmised
that “[w]hen using a mitigated FONSI that is not a decision document, the binding commitment must come from a statute other than NEPA and should be incorporated in an
agency’s decision document.” THE NEPA TASK FORCE, REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: MODERNIZING NEPA IMPLEMENTATION 69 (2003).
247. Letter from Bruce Pendery, Attorney at Law, Wyoming Outdoor Council, to Matt
Anderson, Project Lead at 42 (Apr. 5, 2007), available at http://www.wyomingoutdoor
council.org/html/what_we_do/air_quality/pdfs/Draft%20PAPASEIS%20Comments.pdf
[hereinafter Pendery, SEIS Comments].
248. Id. at 43.
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tions. . .committed as part of the decision shall be implemented by the
lead agency or other appropriate consenting agency,’ some courts have
viewed ROD commitments as legally enforceable by citizens, and others
have not.”249
There are the two key questions here: what legal recourse would
one have to challenge an agency if it does not adopt the terms of a ROD?
Secondly, how exactly does an agency, as CEQ recommends, include
monitoring and mitigation commitments in a ROD in a way that constitutes an enforceable commitment? CEQ guidance addresses this issue of
whether ROD commitments are legally binding, but the sum total of the
guidance is a bit ambiguous. In a 1981 guidance document, CEQ indicates that they are enforceable:
This is based on the principle that an agency must comply
with its own decisions and regulations once they are adopted.
Thus, the terms of a Record of Decision are enforceable by
agencies and private parties. A Record of Decision can be used
to compel compliance with or execution of the mitigation measures identified therein.250

In the most recent guidance on the monitoring and mitigation in
NEPA documents, the language is less assertive. CEQ explains in cases
of “mitigation failure,” or where the promised mitigation either fails or
does not take place, the basis of the original NEPA document is called
into question; if federal action remains, NEPA supplementation may be
required.251 CEQ also notes that mitigation failures may cast doubt on
whether similar mitigation measures should be relied upon in future
NEPA documents. However, nowhere in the guidance does it say outright that commitments made in a ROD are legally binding and enforceable by private parties. CEQ also reminds us that it is only under other
legal authorities that agencies may be required to actually do monitoring
and/or mitigation.252 Mitigation failures would be more legally binding
249. Letter from Bruce Pendery Attorney at Law, Wyoming Outdoor Council to Nancy
Suttley, Chair Council on Envtl. Quality, Exec. Office of the President (Apr. 7, 2010), available at http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/current_developments/docs/mmcomments/Wyoming_Outdoor_Council_MM_Comments_04072010.pdf.
250. Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ’s National Environmental Policy
Act Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,037 (Mar. 23, 1981) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts.
1500–08).
251. CEQ Final Guidance on Mitigation and Monitoring, supra note 236, at 3,845 (CEQ
notes, “[I]f there is Federal action remaining, it is appropriate for agencies to consider preparing supplementation NEPA analysis. . .to pursue remaining opportunities to address
the effects of that remaining action.”).
252. CEQ Final Guidance on Mitigation and Monitoring, supra 236, at 3,844 (stating
that: “it is an agency’s underlying authority that provides the basis for the agency to com-
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if the mitigation had served to justify a FONSI, and thus the failure triggers the need for an EIS, or if they served to keep the agency from violating another legal standard.
CEQ highlights in its 2011 guidance document the strength of the
Department of the Army’s NEPA regulations and the fact those regulations affirmatively make ROD commitments legally binding.253 The importance of funding is also addressed by the Army in its regulations,
which state the “project cannot be undertaken until required mitigation
efforts are fully resourced, or until the lack of funding and resultant effects, are fully addressed in the NEPA analysis.”254 These regulations are
used as exemplars in part because they make mitigation and monitoring
commitments in RODs clearly enforceable and thus give such commitments in NEPA documents added integrity. In their 2011 guidance, CEQ
explains that agencies also could self-impose a system whereby funding,
permitting, or other agency decisions are contingent upon the completion of mitigation measures, and they recommend agencies do this.
A number of courts have held that NEPA “does not give rise to a
‘private right of action’ to enforce promises made in EISs.”255 In other
cases, courts have acknowledged that commitments in a decision are legally binding, but generally in cases where agencies issued FONSIs.256 It
mit to perform or require the performance of particular mitigation. That authority also
allows the agency to implement and monitor, or to require the implementation and monitoring of, those mitigation commitments to ensure their effectiveness. . . . NEPA in itself
does no compel the selection of a mitigated approach. But where an agency chooses to base
the use of less extensive NEPA analysis on mitigation, then this guidance is designed to
assist agencies in ensuring the integrity of that decision.”).
253. Id. at 3852 (citing 32 C.F.R. § 651.15(b) (2010)) (stating that mitigation measures
assessed and chosen in an EA or EIS are a binding commitment: “The proponent must
implement those identified mitigations, because they are commitments made as part of the
Army decision.”). 32 C.F.R. § 651.15(c) (2010) states the mitigation measures in FONSIs are
legally binding commitments; if they do not occur the project proponent must submit an
NOI to prepare an EIS, according to the Army’s regulations.
254. Id. The regulations also state that “[t]he mitigation shall become a line item in the
proponents budget or other funding document, if appropriate, or included in the legal
document implementing the action (for example, contracts, leases, or grants).” 32 C.F.R.
§ 651.15(b) (2010).
255. See Thomas O. McGarity, Judicial Enforcement of NEPA-Inspired Promises, 20 ENVTL.
L. 569 (1990).
256. For example, in Lee v. U.S. Air Force, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (D.N.M. 2002), a district
court held that 40 C.F.R. § 1505.3 (2001) makes it clear that agencies are bound to abide by
the mitigation measures they commit to in a Record of Decision. The court explained the
agency is “legally bound by the Record of Decision,” and if they fail to uphold their commitments “they are subject to all recourse contemplated by federal law.” 220 F. Supp. 2d at
1236. In this case, no failure had occurred; the court was responding to challenges regarding the uncertainty, at least in the view of the plaintiffs, that mitigation measures would be
implemented. Commitments made in the Record of Decision to mitigation measures set
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may be challenging, in either case, to bring a claim that an agency has
not fulfilled commitments in a ROD for a variety of reasons. For one, if
there is no remaining federal action, courts may not intervene to require
compliance with a record of decision for an action that is over.257 CEQ
explains, as we noted earlier, in cases where mitigation measures have
not taken place, “if there is Federal action remaining, it is appropriate for
agencies to consider preparing supplemental NEPA analysis and documentation and to pursue remaining opportunities to address the effects
of that remaining action.”258
Some observers take issue with the question of when federal actions are considered over. The Society for Conservation Biology makes
this argument most clearly:
[I]f there is a substantial mitigation failure, then there is still
Federal agency responsibility as a matter of consistency with
NEPA’s policies, so it should be treated as a continuing action. . .. It is illogical to inextricably tie the goals of the mitigation to the initial Federal agency action’s life-span, when the
mitigation may have little, if anything, to do with the action’s
life-span. Said another way, if a short-term Federal action that
substantially fails in its mitigation efforts, it is contrary to the
purpose of the NEPA to abandon the environmental issues
simply because the initial Federal action is no longer ongoing
if the final Federal compliance with NEPA or other Federal
responsibilities depended upon effective mitigation.”259

It is not inconceivable that a court would review a case for compliance with NEPA or other laws after an agency action is completed. Generally, courts assess whether a case is moot based on whether there is

forth in a biological opinion also were considered legally binding. In Tyler v. Cisneros, 136
F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 1998), the court remanded a district court decision that held that claims
against the Housing and Urban Development Agency for failing to enforce mitigation measures were not justiciable, because HUD had no continuing authority over the project.
However, the 9th Circuit reversed, stating that HUD had some authority to act and that
commitments in an ROD shall be implemented (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1505.3 (2010)). Both of
these situations involved FONSIs.
257. See generally McGarity, supra note, 255 (reviewing earlier “late detection scenario”
NEPA cases where courts ruled them moot and other cases where the court did not find the
claims moot).
258. CEQ Final Guidance on Mitigation and Monitoring, supra note 236, at 3,845 (emphasis added).
259. Letter from John M. Fitzgerald, Policy Dir., Soc’y for Conservation Biology & Lyn
Arnold, Policy Assoc. Soc’y for Conservation Biology to Ted Boling, Sr. Counsel, Council
on Envtl. Quality (May 24, 2010) (on file with author).
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any available relief to plaintiffs.260 Courts have in the past reviewed and
ruled against agencies in cases where the only relief available was for the
agency to re-do the environmental analysis and explore possible alternative to mitigate environmental harms.261
2. NEPA Supplementation
If NEPA supplementation is triggered, this could potentially stop
further action until the agency has completed the supplemental analysis.
NEPA requires supplementation in some cases where the assumptions or
commitments in a ROD are no longer valid. CEQ regulations require federal agencies to prepare a supplemental EIS (SEIS) if: 1) “The agency
makes substantial changes in the proposed action that are relevant to
environmental concerns,” or 2) “There are significant new circumstances
or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the
proposed action or its impacts.”262 Additional analysis need not be prepared every time new information emerges, but an SEIS is required if a
new proposal or changes in conditions “will have a significant impact on
the environment in a manner not previously evaluated and
considered.”263
Some studies point to NEPA’s SEIS requirement as a real and potential obstacle to practicing adaptive management.264 Agencies practicing a monitoring and information-intensive adaptive management could
find that new information repeatedly triggers additional NEPA analysis,
which is not cheap or quick. However, supplementing NEPA analysis
can be an appropriate vehicle for meshing adaptive management and
NEPA. And, as discussed in Part II, in some cases courts have allowed
agencies to proceed under an adaptive management plan, despite the
emergence of new information, without supplementation; in others,
when substantial management changes have been undertaken by an

260. See Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. Alexander, 303 F.3d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir.
2002).
261. Id. at 1065, discussing, Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674 (9th Cr. 2008) (in
which the adequacy of an EIS was challenged after a number of buildings and bird habitat
had already been destroyed; the court held that the agency could undertake additional
environmental review to seek potential alternatives and options to mitigate the habitat
damage); Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Gordon, 849 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1988) (declaring that challenges to regulation for a fishing season that had ended were not mooted because effective
relief could be available by allowing more fish to spawn in future years).
262. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(i-ii) (2010).
263. Westlands Water Dist. v. Dept. of Interior, 376 F.3d 853, 873 (9th Cir. 2004); see also
Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378–85 (1989) (requiring agencies to take a
“hard look” at new information to assess whether NEPA supplementation is necessary).
264. See e.g., Benson, supra note 138; Ruhl, supra note 29, at 11-33.
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agency, supplementation has been required.265 Agencies also have used
an EA when new information has emerged, to assess whether they are
still compliant with a prior EIS or need to prepare a new EIS.266 Recall
our discussion in Part II that agencies do not necessarily need to supplement an EIS in cases where they change their decision, as long as the
new decision falls within the range of alternatives analyzed in the original EIS.267
SEISs can also be controversial in that agencies have considerable
discretion to decide when an SEIS is necessary. Courts generally consider
whether the changes are substantial and significant and will result in
effects beyond what was contemplated in any of the alternatives analyzed in the original NEPA document.268 In the case of oil and gas development, as an example, courts have required the BLM to supplement
their analysis when changing the configuration of wells due to potential
effects to wildlife habitat that were not analyzed in the original NEPA
document, but they have also allowed the BLM, based on its handbook,
not to supplement analysis when the number of wells has increased substantially, but the number of acres disturbed has not changed.269
The SEIS issue also is complicated in the context of land use planning. The Supreme Court ruled in Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (2004) that a BLM land use plan is not an “ongoing” major federal
action requiring supplementation.270 Therefore the BLM did not have to
write an SEIS due to increased ORV use in the planning area. Several
district courts have followed SUWA and ruled that there is no ongoing
action requiring NEPA supplementation once an agency approves a land
use plan or issues a license, even if the assumptions in the plan are no

265. See, e.g., Or. Natural Res. Council. Action v. Forest Serv., 659 F. Supp. 1441 (1987);
Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. Rey, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (W.D. Wash. 2005); Klamath Siskiyou
Wildlands Ctr. v. Boody, 468 F.3d 549 (9th Cir. 2006).
266. See Mo.v. Army Corps of Eng’r (In re Operation of the Mo. River Sys. Litig.), 516
F.3d 688 (8th Cir. 2008).
267. Id.
268. Michael S. Freeman & Meg Parish, Supplemental NEPA Analyses: Triggers and Requirements, ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND., PROCEEDINGS FROM A SPECIAL INSTITUTE ON THE
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT, at 6 (Denver, CO: Earthjustice, October 28-29,
2010), at 6 (on file with authors).
269. Id.
270. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 72 (2004). In Marsh v. Oregon
Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 374 (1989), the Court ruled that supplementation is
necessary only if “there remains ‘major Federal action[s]’ to occur.” The Court in Southern
Utah Wilderness Alliance ruled that a land use plan constitutes an “action that is completed
when the plan is approved,” so there is therefore no ongoing “major Federal action” requiring supplementation (“though BLM is required to perform additional NEPA analysis if a
plan is amended or revised”). Norton, 542 U.S. at 72.
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longer valid.271 In these cases new information came to light, such as an
ESA listing or evidence that protective wildlife measures were not working as predicted, but still the courts did not require an SEIS to be prepared. One review of post-SUWA case law summarizes that “federal
agencies have experienced considerable, if not universal, success in arguing that they have no obligation to supplement their NEPA analysis after
SUWA,” particularly when it comes to decisions in land-use plans.272
However, plan amendments require NEPA analysis, as do decisions
made in accordance with plans, including projects such as timber sales or
annual range management decisions; these project-level decisions require compliance with NEPA and may require supplemental analysis in
light of new information if the action is ongoing.273
3. Monitoring
Given this complicated legal landscape, how enforceable is monitoring or an associated toolbox of possible mitigation measures? These
processes are flexible, discretionary in nature, and rely upon a high degree of expertise. It seems unlikely that a court would intervene and rule
an agency’s monitoring insufficient, if they are meeting their commitments at all. So when is monitoring enforceable, if ever?
Agency commitments to monitor are especially suspect when they
are made in a land use plan. In Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (2004), the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the BLM violated its land use plan’s promise that OHV use “will be monitored and
closed if warranted.”274 The Court reasoned that unlike a specific statutory command, “a land use plan is generally a statement of priorities; it
guides and constrains actions, but does not (at least in the usual case)
prescribe them.”275 The Court ruled that the BLM’s commitment to monitor OHV use—“like other ‘will do’ projections of agency action set forth
in land use plans—are not a legally binding commitments enforceable
under [the Administrative Procedures Act (APA)],” because a broad
commitment to monitor is not a discrete action reviewable under the
APA.276 The result is that discretionary processes such as the implemen-

271. See Michael C. Blumm & Sherry L. Bosse, Norton v. SUWA and the Unraveling of
Federal Public Land Planning, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 105 (2007).
272. Id. at 144. The authors note, however, that “SUWA has not absolved agencies from
all obligations to provide supplemental NEPA analysis,” such as the USFS’s management
of an ongoing timber contract for example, or the decision to approve a forest plan amendment. Id.
273. Id.
274. 542 U.S. 55.
275. Id. at 71.
276. Id. at 72.
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tation of monitoring and subsequent mitigation are not generally justiciable when they are written into programmatic plans. However, the
Court acknowledged that monitoring commitments could be written in a
way that they were enforceable if the action were written as a clear and
binding commitment. Still, it was not entirely clear to some observers,
“why a promise in a land plan that an agency ‘will’ undertake a certain
action was not such a ‘binding commitment,’ nor was it clear what it
would take to create such a binding commitment.”277
However, if commitments in plans are written in ways such that
monitoring is required before an action can be taken, this is still actionable
under the APA. For example, survey and manage requirements under
the NWFP require some species to be surveyed prior to ground disturbing activities.278 A failure to comply with these guidelines would be
reviewable in court, if an agency planned an action that was inconsistent
with these requirements in the land use plan. Likewise, environmental
groups have successfully challenged the BLM in court when it approved
grazing leases without monitoring resource conditions, when the land
use plan explicitly stated that such monitoring would occur prior to the
authorization of grazing.279
In the past, plaintiffs have also had success challenging more general monitoring commitments in land use plans when they do so in the
context of discreet agency actions. For example, in Neighbors of Cuddy
Mountain v. Alexander (2002), the 9th Circuit wrestled with the question
of whether plaintiffs could challenge the Forest Service for not demonstrating, with appropriate monitoring information, that it was in compliance with a forest plan standard for old-growth protection (maintaining
a certain percentage of old-growth forest-wide).280 In this case, the court
ruled it could review compliance with a land-use plan standard because
it was being reviewed in the context of a discreet agency action: the approval of a timber sale. Both the regulations to maintain well-distributed
habitat across the forest to protect species viability281 and a forest plan
standard requiring a forest-wide percentage of old-growth were relevant
to the question of whether this particular sale was consistent with the
land-use plan and the regulations. Even though enough old-growth remained in the project area, the court agreed that the USFS needed to
demonstrate with some monitoring information that it was in compli-

277. Blumm & Bosse, supra note 271, at 133.
278. See supra notes 218–219 and accompanying text.
279. See Blumm & Bosse, supra note 271, at 145 (discussing Western Watersheds Project
v. Bennet, 392 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (D. Idaho 2005)).
280. Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. Alexander, 303 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2002).
281. 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (2010).
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ance with the plan. One has to wonder, however, how this case would
fare post-SUWA, if the agency could at least show there was no evidence
that it was out of compliance.
Even outside the context of land use planning, the courts are often
reluctant to force agencies to conduct monitoring. Biber explains that
there are three primary reasons for this: “an agency monitoring program
is neither a ‘final’ nor specific agency ‘action’ that a court can review or
mandate under the APA; the level of compliance by an agency with a
mandatory duty is not for the court to review, as long as at least some
compliance exists; or, the apparently mandatory language in the statute,
regulation, or plan is in fact only hortatory.”282 As was the case with Norton v. SUWA, courts will make a distinction between the reviewability of
discreet agency actions and ongoing agency operations or conduct,
which they are unlikely to interfere with. Courts are also unlikely to review the quality and extent of monitoring taking place, as long as some
monitoring is occurring. For these reasons, and because intermittent
court decisions are unlikely to lead to an effective ongoing monitoring
program, Biber suggests that relying upon the judiciary to make monitoring happen may not be the best strategy.
However, and this is of relevance to triggers, Biber says, “Usually,
courts are more willing to step in when a monitoring duty can be framed
as a precondition to the agency being able to pursue some other activity
that it seeks to accomplish (such as a timber sale or road construction).283
If triggers are written so that specific requirement to monitor x or y must
take place before taking a particular action, this type of commitment is
more enforceable. As we saw in the case of the biological opinion for
salmonid species on the Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers, clearly outlined commitments to monitor may be written into legally binding agreements, such as incidental take permits, such that they are legally
enforceable.284 In that case, it was precisely the enforceability of the monitoring and mitigation commitments that allowed an adaptive management plan to survive in court. Compliance with the plan’s standards had
to be demonstrated prior to annual water delivery decisions being made,
or consultation was reinitiated.
The lesson is that monitoring commitments can be made enforceable, and in some cases they must be made enforceable for an adaptive
management plan to survive legal challenge. Members of the public concerned about accountability should focus on the enforceability of adap-

282. Eric Biber, The Problem of Environmental Monitoring, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 60 (2011).
283. Id. at 62.
284. Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fisherman’s Assns. v. Gutierrez, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1122,1188
(E.D. Cal. 2008).
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tive management plans and their associated triggers. Agencies also have
an interest in creating enforceable plans so that they can proceed with
adaptive management in light of uncertainty around legal standards. In
order to be enforceable, plans must include specific monitoring requirements and timelines tied, through the use of explicit trigger points, to
clear mitigation requirements, also with specific implementation timelines. When such a monitoring/mitigation program is part of a legally
binding agreement, such as an incidental take permit, enforcement is
possible, especially where monitoring serves as a precondition for renewal. If monitoring is written into a land-use plan or project level decision in a way that it serves as a precondition for future actions, this is
also legally enforceable. Furthermore, if such a program served as the
basis for a FONSI and were not implemented, NEPA supplementation
would be triggered. In other cases, even for an EIS ROD, there may be a
requirement for supplementation under NEPA if commitments in the
ROD are not kept. Other statutes with clear legal standards may provide
a vehicle for challenges to a promised monitoring/mitigation program
that is either not succeeding or not occurring at all.
All of these strategies will be less enforceable if monitoring and
mitigation programs are not written with sufficient detail about what is
to be monitored and when, where triggers are set, and what mitigation
measures will be implemented over what timeframe. The perennial questions of who designs and conducts the monitoring and whether the monitoring program is affordable, scientifically valid, and reliable remain
critically important. These issues are not likely to be resolved by courts,
and must be addressed directly by agencies and stakeholders in adaptive
management decisions.
C. Other Monitoring Challenges
Monitoring is the keystone of adaptive management. The importance of monitoring, and learning from what is found, is what fundamentally differentiates adaptive management from other approaches. All
of the case studies, for example, are premised upon some sort of monitoring that is used to gauge whether a trigger is pulled and subsequent
actions are necessary.
There are multiple types and purposes of monitoring.285 Managers
use implementation monitoring to assess whether or not a management
action has been implemented as designed. Effectiveness monitoring is
285. See e.g., David B. Lindenmayer & Gene E. Likens, The Science and Application of
Ecological Monitoring, 143 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION, 1317 (2010); Caroline Stem, et al.,
Monitoring and Evaluation in Conservation: A Review of Trends and Approaches, 19 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 295 (2005) (for additional information on the purposes of monitoring).
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used to check whether agency actions are having the intended results,
such as reducing fire risk in an area, or allowing for riparian biodiversity
to improve. Compliance monitoring may require both of these types of
monitoring to determine whether an agency has complied with a legal
standard, regulation, or trigger. Efficacy or verification monitoring may
be used as part of a research program to further understanding of ecological or social systems. Some federal land laws require forms of monitoring, inventory, and research.286 But monitoring has a checkered past
on the federal lands and for natural resources in general, and is the
Achilles heel of adaptive management.287 There has historically been a
chronic absence of information that is fed back into land use plans and
projects.
Even when required by law or regulation, monitoring often fails
to happen. “Monitoring is a mandatory element of all HCPs” for example.288 Yet research shows that most HCPs do not have adequate monitoring programs.289 One comprehensive review of the literature
concludes that “HCP monitoring and adaptation have both fallen exceedingly short of their potential.”290 USFS management of OHVs provides another example. Monitoring the effects of vehicle use off National
Forest System roads “will be monitored” according to agency regulations.291 Nevertheless, serious monitoring is often not done by the
agency, due to insufficient financial resources and staff and a variety of

286. See e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(c) (2006) (NFMA’s requirement to “insure research
on and [based on continuous monitoring and assessment in the field] evaluation of the
effects of each management system to the end that it will not produce substantial and permanent impairment of the productivity of the land”).
287. See generally W.H. Moir & W.M. Block, Adaptive Management on Public Lands in the
United States: Commitment or Rhetoric? 28 ENVTL. MGMT. 141 (2001); Holly Doremus, Data
gaps in Natural Resource Management: Sniffing for Leaks Along the Information Pipeline, 83 IND.
L.J. 407 (2008).
288. Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,242, 35,253 (June 1,
2000); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A) (2006); 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.22, 17.32, 222.307 (2010).
289. PETER KAREIVA ET AL., NATIONAL CTR. FOR ECOLOGICAL ANALYSIS & SYNTHESIS
WORKING GROUP, USING SCIENCE IN HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS 29 (1999) (finding that
“barely 50% of the plans contain clear monitoring programs, and they rarely include monitoring programs that are both clear and sufficient for evaluation of a plan’s success”), available at http://courses.washington.edu/vseminar/Esc458-8/nceas_hcp.pdf.
290. Camacho, supra note 27, at 324; see also Holly Doremus, The Endangered Species Act:
Static Law Meets Dynamic World, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y, 175, 228 (2010) (stating that
“HCP approval under the ESA is one prominent example of giving lip service to the concept of adaptive management while ignoring its substance”).
291. 36 C.F.R. § 295.5 (2010).
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other programmatic failures.292 These and numerous other examples
show a pattern of systemic failures to monitor particular resources on
federal lands.293
In addition to the legal challenges explored in the previous section, there are other significant challenges to implementing a monitoring-intensive adaptive management or mitigation program. The first is
the tricky set of scientific and technical questions that emerge when designing a monitoring program. This is especially so in the case of “effectiveness monitoring” when monitoring is used to determine whether an
action has achieved its objective. We cannot do justice to this complicated topic here. But, consider the all-important questions of what to
monitor and how to appropriately monitor something. NFMA’s wildlife
diversity mandate provides a case-in-point, as the USFS and the courts
have struggled for years to negotiate a scientifically credible and legally
defensible way to monitor wildlife populations or their habitat on National Forest lands as a way to ensure their viability.294
Similar sorts of scientific disagreements about what and how to
monitor something are a central theme in the case studies. In several instances, outside groups have questioned the science underpinning a
monitoring program or protocol. In the Pinedale oil and gas case, for
example, The Wilderness Society takes issue with the “lack of credible,
defensible science for wildlife monitoring plans,” including their design
parameters, sample sizes, and geographic study boundaries.295 And in
the salmon case, Earthjustice complains that the monitoring promised by

292. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FEDERAL LANDS: ENHANCED PLANNING COULD ASAGENCIES IN MANAGING INCREASED USE OF OFF-HIGHWAY VEHICLES, GAO-09-509 (2009),
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/291861.pdf.
293. For examples pertaining to forest restoration see Thomas H. DeLuca et al., The
Unknown Trajectory of Forest Restoration: A Call for Ecosystem Monitoring, 108 J. FORESTRY 288
(2010); and GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, WILDLAND FIRE REHABILITATION AND RESTORATION: FOREST SERVICE AND BLM COULD BENEFIT FROM IMPROVED INFORMATION ON STATUS OF
NEEDED WORK, GAO-06-670 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/260/250705.
pdf.
294. Compare Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. U.S. Forest Service, 88 F.3d 754,
761–62 (9th Cir. 1996) (ruling that nothing in the 1982 NFMA regulations mandated species
population assessments via on-the-ground counting), with Sierra Club v. Martin, 168 F. 3d
1, 5–7 (11th Cir. 1999) (ruling that the USFS must count actual management indicator species on the ground based on its land-use plan). Much of this debate culminated in the
decision Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). See also Barry R.
Noon et al. Conservation Planning for US National Forest: Conducting Comprehensive Biodiversity Assessments, 53 BIOSCIENCE 1217 (2003).
295. THE WILDERNESS SOC’Y, supra note 146, at 3.
SIST
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NOAA Fisheries will not be effective in protecting salmon populations
or their habitat needs.296
Part of the challenge in these and other cases is the time needed to
make short-term management decisions compared to the time needed to
obtain valid and reliable monitoring data. This mismatch is a central
theme in the monitoring literature and emerged in our review. In the
Pinedale case, for example, some fear that by the time impacts to big
game in the region are detected through monitoring, it may be too late to
remedy them.297 And in the grizzly bear delisting litigation, several
groups voiced concern about the “lag effects” associated with species viability and habitat modification. Impacts from habitat degradation to a
species are often delayed, so there is some concern that short-term monitoring will be insufficient.298 Another issue may be that the spatial design
needed to establish an effective monitoring program may not always
nest perfectly with where an agency wants to take action, making it difficult to design monitoring programs that allow for causal inference with
limited resources.
There is also no escaping the political questions inherent in monitoring. What gets measured? Who does the monitoring? And what activities are permitted or disallowed while the monitoring is being done?
These sorts of questions surfaced repeatedly in the case studies. Consider
again, some of the conflicts about monitoring wildlife on the Pinedale
Anticline. Some groups have questioned how the mule deer population,
which serves as a trigger on the Anticline, was defined in the SEIS in
such a way that the Pinedale Herd was lumped together with a larger
Sublette County Herd for purposes of measurement and analysis.299 The
players involved in this case agreed to using mule deer as a trigger, but
there are ongoing questions about how that trigger could lose its significance if the population is defined too broadly.
Another controversy to arise in the Pinedale case is the role given
to the oil and gas industry in developing and implementing wildlife
monitoring and mitigation plans. Operators in the region were given a
large role to play in not only developing plans but also in the writing of
monitoring contracts. To some, this arrangement “violates basic principles of good governance, public transparency, and the Federal Advisory
296. Supplemental Memorandum in Support of NWF’s Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment at 10–11, Nat’lWildlife Fed. et al., v. State of Or. (D. Or. 2010) (regarding
the 20120 supplemental BiOp).
297. Pendery, SEIS Comments, supra note 247, at 13
298. See e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 19, Western Watersheds
Project et al., v. Servheen, No. 07-cv-243 (D. Idaho June 4, 2007), available at http://www.
westernwatersheds.org/legal/07/grizzly/grizzlycomplaint.pdf.
299. Pendery, SEIS Comments, supra note 247, at 13.
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Committee Act.”300 Perceptions of impropriety in the Pinedale monitoring program were raised by others as well, with some groups suggesting
that “the oil and gas industry was attempting to influence wildlife science in order to achieve the most desirable results.”301
In other cases, questions have arisen about agency-implemented
monitoring programs. As discussed in Part I, bureaucracies have organizational values and biases that help determine what gets measured and
how information is interpreted. As noted by Doremus, “Just as scientists
tend to interpret equivocal evidence in the light most consistent with
their preferred theories, decisionmakers are likely to see equivocal evidence as confirming their preexisting management biases.”302 Agencies
also may have histories that cause them to have staff, databases, or expertise that allow them to monitor certain resources more effectively
than others.
Another important political question is what activities get to proceed while monitoring is ongoing? Consider how the BLM proposed to
use monitoring in its 2006 rangeland regulations.303 In this case, the BLM
could not correct a permittee’s grazing practices or enforce the agency’s
standards and guidelines unless monitoring data showed changes were
necessary. The catch was that “BLM funding and staffing levels do not
provide adequate resources for even minimal monitoring.. . .”304 This arrangement was a concern to many groups and commenting agencies because it meant that monitoring, however unlikely to occur, would have
to be done before remedial actions could be taken for the sake of wildlife
and other resources.305
Monitoring, Mitigation and Funding
Uncertain and inadequate funding is one of the most widely acknowledged challenges to monitoring.306 It is one of the primary reasons
why so many people view with skepticism agency promises to monitor
300. Letter from Stephanie Kessler, The Wilderness Soc’y, to Don Simpson, Wyoming
Dir. BLM (Jan. 6, 2010) (on file with authors).
301. Letter from Dan Heilig, W. Res. Advocates, to Chuck Otto, Field Office Manager,
Pinedale BLM (Oct. 6, 2009) (on file with authors).
302. Doremus, supra note 32, at 55–56.
303. See Grazing Administration – Exclusive of Alaska, 71 Fed. Reg. 39,402 (July 12,
2006) (codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 4100).
304. See W. Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink, 620 F.3d 1187, 1203 (9th Cir. 2010).
305. Id. at 1204.
306. Former CEQ General Counsel Dinah Bear summarizes: “Money for monitoring
and mitigation, particularly in the absence of a particularly high-profile issue or binding
agreement, is notoriously tough to get and. . .always seems to be first on the budgetary
chopping block.” Dinah Bear, Some Modest Suggestions for Improving Implementation of the
National Environmental Policy Act, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 931, 945 (2003).
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and practice adaptive management. This skepticism comes from a history of agency monitoring programs and commitments being unfunded
through Congressional appropriations or internal agency budgeting priorities. Monitoring dollars are often the first to be cut or reshuffled in
agency budgets. This is partly because monitoring can be expensive.
Monitoring as part of the Northwest Forest Plan, for example, cost more
than $50 million over ten years.307 Dollars for monitoring must also compete with other agency priorities. The GAO emphasized this point in its
audit of oil and gas development. It found that the BLM had less time to
mitigate and monitor the environmental impacts associated with oil and
gas development because “staff had to devote increasing amounts of
time to processing drilling permits.”308
Agency commitments to monitor and mitigate are contingent
upon adequate and certain funding. Future agency budgets are inherently uncertain, so how can promises of future monitoring and mitigation be considered binding commitments? This question repeatedly
emerged in the case law and case studies. How, for example, can we
delist wolves or grizzly bears from the ESA and return their management to the States given the uncertainty of future funding? Some argue
that the wolf and grizzly bear plans are not “adequate regulatory mechanisms,” justifying delisting under the ESA, because “no reliable source
for [their] future funding” exists.309
In some of our cases the issue of funding is directly addressed by
agencies in their decision documents. Recall, for instance, the monitoring
and mitigation fund provided by industry (and discussed in the SEIS) in
the Pinedale Anticline case. Habitat conservation plans provide another
example. The ESA requires that “the applicant will ensure that adequate
funding for the plan will be provided.”310 Instead of a “pay as you go”
funding program, HCPs most often outline a priori how mitigation mea-

307. Bormann et al., supra note 208, at 189 tbl.1.
308. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT: INCREASED PERMITTING
ACTIVITY HAS LESSENED BLM’S ABILITY TO MEET ITS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION RESPONSIBILITIES, GAO-05-418 (2005), at 5, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05418.pdf.
309. See Final Rule Designating the Greater Yellowstone Area Population of Grizzly
Bears as a Distinct Population Segment; Removing the Yellowstone Distinct Population
Segment of Grizzly Bears From the Federal List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 72
Fed. Reg. 14,866 (Mar. 29, 2007) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (discussing this issue as it
pertains to grizzly bear delisting and responding to those comments citing Federation of Fly
Fishers v. Daley, 131 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1167–68 (N.D. Cal. 2000) in making this argument).
310. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2006)
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sures will be funded, even if such funds are not always set aside at the
onset of the HCP.311
Agencies typically concede that funding for future planning, monitoring, and mitigation is uncertain, but they nonetheless commit themselves to trying to secure requisite funds. A typical response is that
offered by the FWS in their decision to delist wolves in the Northern
Rockies: “It is not possible to predict with certainty future governmental
appropriations, nor can we commit or require Federal funds beyond
those appropriated. . .[but]. . .[t]he States have committed to secure the
necessary funding to manage the wolf populations under the guidelines
established by their approved State wolf management plans.”312 A commitment to seek funding is essential to CEQ, who also asks agencies to
disclose “the possible lack of funding and assess the resultant environmental effects.”313 In other cases, agencies have made up-front commitments to devote a percentage of funding to monitoring. For example,
monitoring was required under the original Stewardship Contracting
Authority, and some National Forest units promised stakeholders upfront that a particular percentage of funding would be committed to
monitoring.314

311. KAREIVA, supra note 289, at 28 (finding that “98% of the HCPs outlined a priori the
funding sources for the mitigation proposed, but only 77% had significant funds set aside
to pay for mitigation at the onset of the HCP”).
312. Final Rule to Identify the Northern Rocky Mountain Population of Gray Wolf as a
Distinct Population Segment and to Revise the List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 74 Fed. Reg. 15,123, 15,151 (Apr. 2, 2009) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17); see also Rule
Designating the Greater Yellowstone Area Population of Grizzly Bears as a Distinct Population Segment; Removing the Yellowstone Distinct Population Segment of Grizzly Bears
From the Federal List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 72 Fed. Reg. 14,866 (Mar. 29,
2007) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (FWS responding to the issue of uncertain funding upon
grizzly bear delisting).
313. Memorandum For Heads of Federal Departments and Agencies: Appropriate Use
of Mitigation and Monitoring and Clarifying the Appropriate Use of Mitigated Findings of
No Significant Impact (Jan 14, 2011), at 9, available at http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/current_developments/docs/Mitigation_and_Monitoring_Guidance_14Jan2011.pdf. This sort of assessment is often not done by agencies. In responding to an appeal of the Forest Plan
Amendments necessary for the delisting of grizzly bears, the USFS states that “[i]t is
outside the scope of the FEIS to analyze the implication of not receiving the funding to
implement the amendment” and to conduct the promised monitoring. U.S. Forest Service,
Intermountain Region, Appeal Decision #06-04-00-0051-A217 (Apr. 2, 2007) (on file with
authors), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/r4/reading/appeals/decisions/bt/06-04-000051.pdf.
314. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 347 (1998). Under the White Mountains Stewardship Contract,
for example, the Apache-Sitgreaves National Forest dedicated three percent of project costs
to funding a monitoring program. See S. SITKO AND S. HURTEAU. EVALUATING THE IMPACTS
OF FOREST TREATMENTS: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS OF THE WHITE MOUNTAIN STEWARDSHIP PRO-
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Ideally, a realistic funding strategy for a monitoring program will
be identified by agencies and other parties before an adaptive management plan is implemented. Monitoring is expensive, and parties should
devote time up front to determine what funds are available, what can be
realistically monitored with those funds, and what the monitoring priorities are. Stakeholders, including partnering agencies, can help ensure
that monitoring is funded and implemented. If parties want to be certain
monitoring occurs, the monitoring can be linked to showing compliance
with a legal standard or written into a plan as a precondition for future
actions. Alternatively, they could be written into an ROD as a specific
and enforceable commitment and coupled with regulations like those of
the Department of the Army’s affirmatively stating that ROD commitments are legally binding (as discussed in Part IV, 2).
Agencies should pay close attention to ensuring transparency and
limiting conflicts of interest in the design, implementation, and interpretation of a monitoring program. Ideally, a kind of multi-party monitoring oversight board would be set up to support transparency and
accountability. If industry or other parties help to fund monitoring, there
should be a separation or some kind of check and balance, so that those
with vested interests in monitoring outcomes, including agencies, are not
solely entrusted with the design and implementation of the monitoring
program. If there is significant doubt that a monitoring program will be
implemented, agencies should disclose and analyze the potential consequences of this in their NEPA documents.
D. Setting the Triggers
The most important question about using triggers is where to set
them. Each case is very different, so there is obviously no single answer
that can be provided to this question. Nonetheless, our review brings
into relief some issues that should be considered.
As discussed in Part I, adaptive management is most often recommended in situations characterized by widespread uncertainty. Unlike
synoptic planning, adaptive management not only acknowledges, but
embraces, uncertainty and sees these situations as an opportunity to
learn. With adaptive management, decision makers more fully appreciate how things might not go as predicted and to some extent expect the
unexpected. Given this, some important questions arise: does the use of
pre-identified triggers run counter to the theory and spirit of adaptive
management? Why assume that a manager knows enough about a given

JECT (2010), available at http://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/stelprdb520
7076.pdf.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMN\52-2\NMN207.txt

Fall 2012]

unknown

Seq: 71

ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT

10-DEC-12

14:45

513

problem that trigger mechanisms can be pre-identified and then correctly set? And does such an approach discount inherent uncertainties
and lead us back to the predictive-based management models of the
past?
These questions explain why most of the cases reviewed in Part III
are more aligned with contingency planning and adaptive mitigation
than adaptive management. All of them attempt to bring a degree of
certainty and accountability to the practice of adaptive management by
planning for a range of possible contingencies and mitigation measures.
The uncertainties inherent in the cases are essentially negotiated by
agencies and outside groups.
Instead of paralyzing all parties, the uncertainty is managed by
focusing on a set of relevant triggers and responses. Take, for instance,
the negotiation of “changed circumstances” and “unforeseen circumstances” in HCPs (as reviewed in Part III). The former are planned for in
HCPs so that a permittee commits to taking particular actions if a preidentified changed circumstance arises. This is not the case for the latter,
however, as a permittee can go about her business even if an “unforeseen
circumstance” changes things.315 As discussed above, this is what makes
the “no surprises” provision so controversial, but it also demonstrates
how uncertainty can be made more manageable.
Common to the case studies are scientific and political disagreements about where triggers and thresholds should be set. People often
like the idea of using triggers in theory but disagree on how they are
used in practice. At the core of these conflicts are different political judgments about what to do in the face of uncertainty and risk—a pervasive
question in environmental law and policy.316 Who carries the burden of
proof and what value gets the benefit of the doubt when it comes to
making decisions that may or may not cause harm to the environment?
Shall a precautionary principle be used in setting trigger points for example, or should we demand that regulations not be imposed without more
unequivocal scientific justification? And what probability of success
should plans using triggers provide?

315. Though in granting an ITP, the Services must ensure that the taking will not “appreciably” reduce the likelihood of survival and recovery of the species. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1539(a)(2)(B) (2006).
316. See e.g., Courtney Schultz, Responding to Scientific Uncertainty in U.S. Forest Policy,
11 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 253 (2008); Dave Owen, Probabilities, Planning Failures, and Environmental Law, 84 TULANE L. REV. 265 (2009); Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future of
the Endangered Species Act’s Best Available Science Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397 (2004); J.B. Ruhl,
The Battle Over Endangered Species Act Methodology, 34 ENVTL. L. 555 (2004); Cass R. Sunstein,
Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003 (2003).
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Generally speaking, environmental interests involved in the case
studies urge that more precaution be used in setting triggers points. Instead of managing at knife’s edge, they want greater levels of confidence
that an action will not cause harm. Triggers, they argue, should be set
with more precaution and larger margins of safety. Wolf management
plans provide an example. Those groups challenging them argue that the
breeding pair triggers used in the Montana and Idaho Plans are biologically indefensible. The breach here is significant: the states are basing
their triggers on the FWS’s 30 pair/300 wolf recovery threshold, while
plaintiffs make the case for 2,000-5,000 wolves.
A similar sort of divide is evident in the Columbia case with those
challenging the plan wanting triggers to be set with a greater margin of
safety for salmon. But this case also raises another common question related to our selected cases: what happens when a trigger is pulled or a
threshold is crossed? Those challenging the Columbia AMIP take issue
not only with the lack of precaution in setting triggers, but also criticize
the lack of meaningful actions that shall take place if they are pulled.
Plaintiffs cite NRDC v. Kempthorne (as discussed in Part II) in arguing
that adaptive management needs to do more than prescribe more meetings to be held whenever a trigger is pulled.317 Instead, the triggers
should initiate mandatory and substantive actions that must be taken by
NOAA Fisheries—and these actions should geared towards the recovery
of salmon, not an evasion of the ESA and its no jeopardy standard.318
Using the ESA in this fashion provides one of the most relevant
ways in which wildlife-based triggers can be set. Though numerical
thresholds will have to be established on a case-by-case basis, the ESA
provides a purpose and legal sideboards. The ESA’s no-jeopardy standard is important in this regard, but so too is the law’s goal of promoting
recovery.319 In some of our cases groups want thresholds established for
wildlife that ensure their long-term viability; in other words, they want
minimum population numbers that will not be crossed.320 But triggers
could also be established in a more proactive way using the ESA. Trig-

317. Supplemental Memorandum in Support of NWF’s Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment, in National Wildlife Federation, et al., v. State of Oregon (D. Or. 2010), at
29 (regarding the 2010 Supplemental BiOp).
318. The State of Oregon’s Response to the Adaptive Management Implementation
Plan at 18, Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 839 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (D. Or.
2011).
319. ESA recovery plan are to include “objective, measurable criteria which, when met,
would result in a determination, in accordance with the provisions of this section, that the
species be removed from the list.” 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1)(B)(ii) (2006).
320. See e.g., Pendery, SEIS Comments, supra note 247, at 39.
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gers could be set, for example, so that agencies do not contribute toward
the need to list candidate species or other species of special status.
The ESA can help formulate the appropriate use of triggers in
some situations, and a variety of additional laws, regulations, and standards could be used in others. Triggers do not have to be invented in the
dark; they can be built by using preexisting laws and regulations for guidance and purpose. Some environmental laws, such as the Clean Air Act,
are especially up to the task because they require compliance with quantifiable standards.321 In these cases, triggers could be used to specify how
standards will not be violated or what would happen if they were.322
For example, forest planning under the National Forest Management Act has historically incorporated standards into forest plans that
serve as triggers that cannot be crossed.323 A standard, as defined by the
USFS, is a “mandatory constraint on project and activity decisionmaking,
established to help achieve or maintain the desired condition or conditions, to avoid or mitigate undesirable effects, or to meet applicable legal
requirements.”324 Standards are generally binding and legally enforceable, so if used as triggers, they could provide greater assurances that preidentified lines are not crossed.
The types of standards used in land use planning differ in scale,
specificity, and complexity. Some administrative regions of the USFS, for
example, have standards cutting across multiple National Forests. For
example, soil quality standards exist with quantified thresholds for soil
productivity that, if exceeded, trigger restorative practices.325 Questions
remain about how soil thresholds are determined and monitored by the
USFS, but they demonstrate how a planning standard could be used in
the context of adaptive management. Another example is the Grizzly
Bear Amendment, which amended multiple forest plans and set stan-

321. Id. at 38 (reviewing BLM law and regulations requiring compliance with air quality
standards).
322. Id. at 38–39 (making the case that the BLM should set air quality thresholds based
on current laws, regulations, and standards).
323. 36 C.F.R. § 219 (2010).
324. National Forest System Land Management Planning, 76 Fed. Reg. 8,480,
8,517(d)(1)(iii) (proposed Feb. 14, 2011) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt 219).
325. One such threshold requires management action be taken if there is a “detrimental
disturbance” of greater than fifteen percent, a number typically applied across a timber unit
area. See Thomas H. DeLuca & Vincent Archer, Forest Soil Quality Standards Should be Quantifiable, 64 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 117, 118, 122 (2009); Deborah Page-Dumrose, et
al., Soil Quality Standards and Guidelines for Forest Sustainability in Northwestern North
America,138 FOREST ECOLOGY & MGMT. 445 (2000).
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dards for road density, grazing, food storage, and other practices, that
applied in key areas of grizzly habitat.326
Other standards apply to particular areas or “zones” as delineated
in a land use plan; they often permit or prohibit various uses. Standards
can also be applied forest-wide, such as having so many feet required for
a stream buffer or a specified percentage of old growth that shall be
maintained. Standards like these can be controversial, but they can also
be used in tandem with triggers and adaptive management because they
help define their purpose and boundaries. Triggers could be set at the
same point as standards, and thus function as a kind of red-light trigger,
or could be set to indicate that conditions are moving towards a forest
plan standard, serving more as a yellow-light or warning trigger. As discussed in Part I, adaptive management requires the identification of clear
and measurable management objectives, and standards can provide a
relevant metric for doing so.
Laws, regulations, and plan standards can be used to determine
what triggers to use and where to set them, but it is also possible to go
above and beyond these legal requirements and use triggers and thresholds in a more precautionary way. One problem with using thresholds in
natural resources management is the tendency to manage at a point just
shy of the tipping point.327 For example, some laws and regulations are
designed so that nothing happens until some threshold is crossed, such
as a impermissible load of sediment being dumped into a waterway, as
prohibited under the Clean Water Act. Triggers get pulled in these cases,
but the response might be too little, too late. For example, relying upon
listing under the ESA to trigger species protections is undesirable, because in the U.S. species are often listed well after the crossing of what
would be considered viability thresholds.328
Regulatory thresholds should be informed by, but often should
not correspond with ecological thresholds. In almost all cases, if we are
aiming for resource protection, we would want to alter management
practices before reaching a potentially irreversible ecological tipping
point. Ideally, we might design regulatory triggers and thresholds along
a continuum, including green, yellow, and red light triggers, that is more
326. See USDA FOREST SERV., FOREST PLAN AMENDMENT FOR GRIZZLY BEAR HABITAT CONGREATER YELLOWSTONE AREA NATIONAL FORESTS, RECORD OF DECISION
(2006), available at http://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/stelprdb51877
74.pdf.
327. See e.g., David R. Montgomery, Input and Output-Oriented Approaches to Implementing Ecosystem Management, 19 ENVTL. MGMT. 183 (1995).
328. For additional information, see D.W. Crumpacker, Prospects for sustainability of biodiversity based on conservation biology and US Forest Service approaches to ecosystem management, 40 LANDSCAPE & URBAN PLAN. 47 (1998).
SERVATION FOR THE
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aligned with ecological reality, although this would undoubtedly create
a complicated legal framework.329
Finally, a common conflict in the case studies is how baselines are
used in conjunction with triggers and mitigation responses. In some
cases fish and wildlife numbers are used in a way to trigger various
management actions. This means that a temporal reference point must be
chosen by an agency in order to anchor a standard and trigger. A reference point is needed in order to measure and evaluate change and the
selection of a baseline date and level can be highly contentious. Consider, for instance, long-running conflicts regarding the baseline against
which salmon jeopardy and recovery is evaluated. Biological opinions
require that environmental baselines be assessed, so what historical reference point should the Services choose in determining its baseline reference: a period of relative salmon abundance or scarcity?330
Another example of contested baselines is provided by the
Pinedale case. In designing its wildlife monitoring and mitigation matrix,
the BLM chose mule deer and sage grouse as two relevant metrics. A
specified percentage decline of these species triggers various responses
and mitigation measures. But what year should be used for the baseline?
For mule deer, the BLM chose 2006, six year after oil and gas development intensified in the region. This was challenged by environmental
groups who understand how easily baselines can be “gamed” by agencies (and lawmakers).331 On the Pinedale Anticline, The Wilderness Society wants baseline information collected prior to development so that
“appropriate standards and thresholds can be developed that warn of
environmentally damaging trends before it is too late.”332 And the Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership argues that the BLM strategically reset the mule deer baseline in order to incorporate substantial
declines in the herd since 2000.333
All of these issues lead us back to the contentious issue of who
sets the trigger points and where. Although determinations of risk will
have to be made on a case-by-case basis, we can offer two recommendations. First, decisions about trigger points should be transparent in terms

329. See Malcolm L. Hunter et al., Thresholds and the Mismatch Between Environmental
Laws and Ecosystems, 23 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1053, 1054 (2009).
330. See Blumm & Putnam, supra note 117.
331. See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Gaming the Past: The Theory and Practice of Historic
Baselines in the Administrative State, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2011).
332. THE WILDERNESS SOC’Y, supra 146, at 2.
333. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum of Points
and Authorities at 14, Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, Case No. 1:08cv-1047-RJL (D.D.C. Oct. 9, 2009), available at http://www.eenews.net/public/25/17642/
features/documents/2009/10/15/document_ll_02.pdf.
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of the choices that are made about risk, how baselines are used, and how
goals and outcomes are identified. The framework of mitigation, monitoring, and the role of triggers should ideally be established through a
multi-party process that spreads out decision-making and oversight to
limit conflicts of interest. Secondly, agencies should consider how to use
a continuum of trigger points instead of simply a single red-light trigger
that must not be crossed. This allows for proactive intervention before
resource conditions reach a crisis point. Additionally, in almost all cases
we would ideally utilize triggers in a way that prevents the crossing of
ecological thresholds.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Natural resource managers are increasingly using adaptive management approaches in their plans and decisions. Situations where agencies choose to pursue an adaptive decision-making framework will
almost always be characterized by high levels of uncertainty and controversy. Adaptive plans provide a way to proceed in the face of uncertainty and use management as an opportunity to learn about resources
conditions and ecosystem processes. Triggers offer a potential way of
providing accountability to the practice of adaptive management. This
can be critically important to ensuring the integrity of decision-making,
meeting legal requirements, and providing some certainty about the
sideboards of future actions to stakeholders.
Based on our review, we can make several key observations and
recommendations for the effective use of triggers. Generally the most
contentious issues are where and how triggers are set, who designs, conducts, and funds the monitoring, and the enforceability of mitigation and
monitoring timelines. The following recommendations offer some suggestions for navigating these issues.
A. Adaptive management should include a clear feedback loop and
be conducted in a way that allows for learning.
We make a number of distinctions between different decisionmaking frameworks that are implemented under the umbrella of adaptive management. Some of the cases reviewed fail to capitalize on opportunities to learn about resource conditions and the causes of those
conditions. Instead, they follow what is more of an adaptive mitigation
approach. We argue that in most cases agencies should pursue something more than adaptive mitigation and should be careful about defining adaptive management in a loose, ad hoc fashion. This can create
unmet expectations and subsequently erode trust with partners.
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Furthermore, opportunities to learn should not be foregone.
Learning will make mitigation, and resource management in general,
more effective and efficient in the future. Without learning, mitigation
may be increased in cases where resources are not responding as desired,
without knowing what is the cause of failure. Put simply, this may be a
waste of time and money for both agencies and private parties.
Some efforts do not specify what will be done with monitoring
information or how it will feed back into decision-making. Methods for
feeding information back into a structured decision-making process
should be explicit and determined during the design of an adaptive
management program.
B. Monitoring programs and triggered mitigation measures should
be enforceable and include pre-specified timelines.
The enforceability of a monitoring and mitigation program should
be of interest to agencies, to ensure the integrity of their processes, and to
private parties seeking to hold agencies accountable if they do not meet
their commitments. Without enforceability, such programs will appear to
be a lot of hand waving to disguise open-ended, discretionary processes
devoid of accountability. This will only increase controversy. There is
little point in going through the process of using triggers if, in the end,
they provide no additional degree of certainty and accountability.
It is challenging, but not impossible, to write monitoring and mitigation commitments in a way that they are enforceable. As we have seen,
in some cases commitments must be made enforceable for an adaptive
management plan to survive legal challenge. Monitoring is most clearly
enforceable when it is required as a pre-condition for another decision.
For example, monitoring under the NWFP was required for some species
prior to project implementation. Explicit monitoring and mitigation requirements can also be included in legally binding agreements, such as
permits, and the terms of these permits can be enforced in some situations by agencies and/or private parties. A monitoring and/or mitigation commitment that serves as the basis for a NEPA decision also could
be enforceable, in the sense that a lack of monitoring or mitigation might
trigger supplemental NEPA analysis.
In all of these cases, monitoring and mitigation will be more enforceable and constitute a clearer commitment if the details of the plan
are pre-specified. It is necessary to identify what will be monitored,
when monitoring will occur, when monitoring information will trigger a
change in management action, where the trigger points are set, when the
mitigation will be implemented, and what activities can continue while
monitoring or mitigation decisions are ongoing.
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If commitments are made in large-scale planning documents,
these will be most meaningful if desired conditions are clearly outlined
and monitoring commitments are made binding. If agencies are committed to making monitoring and mitigation commitments legally binding,
the Department of the Army’s regulations serve as exemplars, as they
affirmatively make commitments in a ROD legally binding and enforceable. In short, enforceability is contingent upon several factors, but agencies have the discretion to make their monitoring and mitigation
measures binding and enforceable if they choose to do so.
C. In order to survive judicial review, agencies must demonstrate
that they will not violate substantive legal requirements.
Agencies must demonstrate that their adaptive management
plans will meet legal standards and requirements. If they choose to proceed despite uncertainty that substantive standards will be met in the
future, they must show that they have a specific and enforceable monitoring and mitigation strategy that is within their power to implement if
unacceptable effects are detected.
In the context of NEPA, agencies can successfully use tiering and
build adaptability into documents. Courts do not always require additional NEPA analysis when new information emerges, as long as any
changes in action and predicted effects are all within the range of what
was analyzed in the original NEPA document. Additionally if agencies
use thresholds in their monitoring programs, they must pay attention to
how they interpret these thresholds in their NEPA documents. Courts
may look for explicit explanation of how pre-set thresholds or triggers
relate to significance of effects under NEPA or how they relate to other
legal requirements.
D. The responsibilities for designing, conducting, interpreting, and
funding monitoring should be made explicit and up front.
Some of the most contentious issues that arise throughout our
analysis are who designs and conducts the monitoring program and
whether it is affordable, scientifically valid, and likely to yield useable
information about resource effects. This requires concerted attention
early in the stages of project and program planning to determine where
uncertainty is prevalent, what the monitoring priorities are, what can be
effectively monitored, and how the monitoring will be funded.
Strategic choices will have to be made as to what can and should
be monitored with available resources. Agencies and other parties
should identify a funding strategy before an adaptive management plan
is implemented. Effecting a high quality and useful monitoring program
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is something that will require collaborative engagement with stakeholders and partnering agencies, as this is not something that will be
achieved through legal enforcement. Courts may be able to enforce
whether some monitoring occurs, but they are limited in their ability to
determine the quality of monitoring.
Agencies should aim for transparency and avoid conflicts of interest in the design and implementation of a monitoring program. We recommend considering the establishment of some kind of multi-party
monitoring oversight board to ensure transparency and accountability. If
industry or other parties help fund monitoring, there should be a system
in place so that those with vested interests in monitoring outcomes, including agencies, are not solely entrusted with the design and implementation of the monitoring program.
E. Decisions about trigger points and trigger mechanisms should be
made transparently and be explicit.
One of the most contentious issues is that of who sets the trigger
points and where. This determination is a heavily loaded choice involving determinations about how risk-prone or risk-averse a program or
project is in its approach to resource management. Determinations of
risk will have to be made on a case-by-case basis. We recommend that
decisions about trigger points be transparent in terms of the choices that
are made about risk, how baselines are used to set the trigger points, and
how goals and outcomes are identified. Again, agencies and stakeholders should consider utilizing a multi-party process to navigate these contentious issues.
Agencies also should consider incorporating a continuum of trigger points instead of a single red-light trigger that must not be crossed.
This allows for proactive intervention before resource conditions reach a
crisis point. In almost all cases where natural resource conservation is a
goal, we recommend that triggers be used in a way that prevents the
crossing of ecological thresholds, since these often correspond with tipping points that may not be reversible. In some cases, the best approach
will be to include several types of triggers, some of which serve as green
lights allowing activities to proceed, some of which serve as indicators or
warnings, and some of which indicate bottom line standards for legal
compliance that cannot be crossed.
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